surance and in order for that to be available, the professional has had to incur legal liability, which is to say the courts have found or would be likely to find that this was a case of malpractice. This is inconsistent with saying that it was a good-faith mistake. The courts, desiring to compensate the victim for professional errors produced by a good-faith mistake, must label it as serious wrongdoing in order to unlock the insurance proceeds. Perhaps a better analog that could be used here to develop protection for good-faith mistakes would be the concept of products liability insurance developed when it was not possible or proper to find the manufacturer or retailer of a defective product at fault. This is a kind of insurance scheme developed to spread the loss across all consumers by charging each a small increase in the price to create an insurance fund that would be used to compensate those who actually were injured. This has not raised serious practical or cost problems in manufacturers' liability because the incidence of serious injury from a defective product is sufficiently low in comparison to the number of products sold that the cost to each consumer is not large. The mistakes professionals make that they would like to have labeled good-faith mistakes are proportionately larger. We can see this in the cost of malpractice insurance among some specialties, such as obstetrics or neurosurgery where unsatisfactory performance is sufficiently frequent and expensive that the "insurance" cost which must be passed on to consumers or to health insurers is very great indeed.