which the southern delegates have not; that, on the contrary, the maneuvers of the former have been commonly engaged, with success, in dividing the latter against each other.
FEDERAL TAXATION AND THE DOCTRINE OF IMPLIED POWERS (PART I)
No wiser, more perspicacious, or farsighted Antifederalist analyses of the Constitution were composed than the essays by "BRUTUS."While other voices were shrill, his was restrained; wild and visionary fears filled the imaginations of other Antifederalists, yet "Brutus" distinguished between the possible and the probable. With unusual precision he described how the Constitution would come to be interpreted in order to augment federal power. His rebuttals of Hamiltonian logic in effect antedate Jefferson's similar position a decade later, and Maryland's brief in the McCulloch case of 1819. Indeed, it antedates an entire philosophy of limited government, state's rights, and maximum individual liberty, which many theorists still propound. The following is from "Brutus" fifth essay in The New-York Journal, December 13, 1787.
This constitution considers the people of the several states as one body corporate, and is intended as an original compact; it will therefore dissolve all contracts which may be inconsistent with it. This not only results from its nature, but is expressly declared in the 6th article of it. The design of the constitution is expressed in the preamble, to be, "in order to form a more perfect union, to establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and posterity." These are the ends this government is to accomplish, and for which it is invested with certain powers; among these is the power "to make all laws which are necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers and all other powers vested by this constitution in the government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof." It is a rule in construing a law to consider the objects the legislature had in view in passing it, and to give it such an explanation as to promote their intention. The same rule will apply in explaining a constitution. The great objects then are declared in this preamble in general and indefinite terms to be to provide for the common welfare, and an express power being vested in the legislature to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution all the powers vested in the general government. The inference is natural that the legislature will have an authority to make all laws which they shall judge necessary for the common safety, and to promote the general welfare. This amounts to a power to make laws at discretion. No terms can be found more indefinite than these, and it is