his prerogative of a conditional control upon the proceedings of that body, however injurious they may be to the public welfare? It will be his interest to coincide with the views of the senate, and thus become the head of the aristocratic junto. The king of England is a constituent part in the legislature, but although an hereditary monarch, in possession of the whole executive power, including the unrestrained appointment to offices, and an immense revenue, enjoys but in name the prerogative of a negative upon the parliament. Even the king of England, circumstanced as he is, has not dared to exercise it for near a century past. The check of the house of representatives upon the senate will likewise be rendered nugatory for want of due weight in the democratic branch, and from their constitution they may become so independent of the people as to be indifferent of its interests. Nay, as Congress would have the control over the mode and place of their election, by ordering the representatives of a whole state to be elected at one place, and that too the most inconvenient, the ruling powers may govern the choice, and thus the house of representatives may be composed of the creatures of the senate. Still the semblance of checks may remain, but without operation.
This mixture of the legislative and executive moreover highly tends to corruption. The chief improvement in government, in modern times, has been the complete separation of the great distinctions of power; placing the legislative in different hands from those which hold the executive; and again severing the judicial part from the ordinary administrative. "When the legislative and executive powers (says Montesquieu) are united in the same person or in the same body of magistrates, there can be no liberty."
NO SEPARATION OF DEPARTMENTS RESULTS IN NO RESPONSIBILITY
The dilemma of the founding fathers, according to Richard Hofstadter, consisted in their lack of faith in the people, but insistence that government must be based upon the people. ( The American Political Tradition, New York, 1957, pp. 3-7). The president was screened from the population by the device of an electoral college; senators were not to be elected directly.
A London writer, "LEONIDAS," felt that since the powers of the President and the Senate were not completely separated, and since neither suffered "amenability to constituents," the checks and balances of the English system would be lacking. In short, there would be no responsibility. "Leonidas" did not fully understand Article II Section 1 of the Constitution. Nevertheless, the essay was obviously welcomed by Antifederalists and was reprinted from the London Timesin The Freeman's Journal; Or, The North-American Intelligencer, July 30, 1788.