advanced industrial contexts such as the European Union and the
North American Free Trade Agreement. Those wishing to facilitate cooperation in these contexts will do well to consider how national decision makers frame and assess the utilities associated with policy decisions.
Ultimately, effective institutions and regional executive leadership aspire to change the bases on which developing country elites frame their
participation questions and calculate their utilities. In the short term,
this means undertaking measures to educate and socialize member-state
elites to expect short- and long-term collective national and personal
utilities from regional cooperation. In the long term, developing country
elites may conclude that collective policies are the best means to achieve
national and personal goals. Over time, cooperative norms may be established to the extent that each new regional policy initiative does not
elicit a reassessment of the benefits of cooperation. Elites may come to
automatically assume that the solutions to their problems may be found
on the regional level. Policy decisions may come to be framed habitually
on the collective level. At this point, a community in the Deutschian
sense will have been achieved.
Chile's Junta came to power as a result of a 1973 military coup d'état.
Shagari's government in Nigeria was democratically elected; however, it was
preceded by four military regimes: JTU Aguyi-Ironsi, January 15-July 29, 1966; Yakubu Gowon, July 19, 1966-July 29, 1975; Murtala Muhammed, July 29,
1975-February 13, 1976; and Olusegun Obasanjo, February 13, 1976-October 1,
1979 ( Maduagwe, 1993: 67-68). Although successful military coups are not part
of the political tradition in the Philippines, armed insurgencies are. In addition
to the Muslim insurgency in the South, Philippine governments have been challenged by communist guerrilla activities throughout the country's history.
Keohane ( 1989: 4, 6) discusses three measures of institutionalization: (1) commonality, the degree to which expectations about appropriate behavior and
understandings about how to interpret actions are shared by system participants;
(2) specificity, the degree to which these expectations are clearly specified in the
form of rules; and (3) autonomy, the extent to which the institution can promulgate or alter its own rules rather than rely on outside agents to do so. These
criteria are suggested by Samuel Huntington (1968: 20), who defines autonomy
as "the development of political organizations and procedures that are not simply expressions of the interest of particular social groups." Huntington's three
other criteria for institutionalization include adaptability, coherence, and complexity. Although some level of institutionalization is required for effectiveness,
institutionalization does not necessarily guarantee effectiveness. Highly institutionalized structures and procedures may become rigid or irrelevant.
Social incentives, such as those associated with reputation, derive from the
concurrent desires to gain or maintain approval and avoid censure; they work