Arms Control and European Security

By Graeme P. Auton | Go to book overview

10
Political Accommodation and Conflict Avoidance: Superpower Accord on the Neutral Status of States

Audrey Kurth Cronin

One alternative to traditional arms control between East and West is the neutralization of states by major powers. Neutralization can remove disputed states from the East-West conflict and accord them a status of perpetual neutrality, guaranteed by the major powers. In theory, neutralization transforms such a state or territory into a permanent buffer zone, ensuring the independence and territorial integrity of the state, inserting a geographical divider between enemies, and encouraging greater international stability.

Neutralization has a long history in the modern states system, and recent calls for its use as an elixir for international ills have demonstrated a resurgence of interest in the concept. The permanent, unified neutrality of nation-states like Austria and Switzerland seems a model solution for small states caught in conflicts between the incompatible interests of major powers. Since 1945 neutralization has been suggested as a solution for the unification of Germany, Korea, and (in the 1960s) Vietnam. It was briefly attempted in Laos in 1962, and unsuccessfully proposed for all of Southeast Asia by the Malaysians in 1970. Neutralization of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip has been intermittently suggested as part of a solution to the Arab-Israeli dispute (though the upsurge of Palestinian nationalism in 1988-89 has now cast doubt on its feasibility), and some commentators have envisioned setting up a neutralized Palestinian state. Recently the Soviet Union has proposed neutralization "on the

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Arms Control and European Security
Table of contents

Table of contents

  • Title Page iii
  • Contents v
  • Acknowledgments vii
  • Introduction 1
  • 1: The Conceptual Dimensions of Arms Control 5
  • Notes 21
  • 2: Atlantic Security vs. Arms Control: A New European Imbalance? 25
  • Notes 38
  • Notes 38
  • 3: START, SDI, and Arms Control 41
  • Notes 56
  • 4: The Soviet Union and Arms Control 59
  • Notes 70
  • 5: Arms Control and Gorbachev: The View From the Public 73
  • Notes 93
  • 6: Conventional Arms Control in Europe: Beyond MBFR and CDE 95
  • Notes 108
  • 7: The CSCE Process: A Way to European Peace in Security 111
  • Notes 125
  • 8: Arms Control and NATO's Maritime Dimension 127
  • Notes 142
  • 9 - Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones: A Northern European Perspective 145
  • 10: Political Accommodation and Conflict Avoidance: Superpower Accord on the Neutral Status of States 159
  • CONCLUSIONS 173
  • CONCLUSIONS 174
  • Selected Bibliography 179
  • Index 193
  • About the Editor and Contributors 203
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