UNITY IN MULTIPLICITY
Among homonyms, those which are associated hold the greatest philosophical interest. If he can establish both non-univocity and coredependence for some central philosophical concepts, Aristotle will justifiably claim to have introduced a powerful methodology for rejecting Platonism without adopting a purely negative or destructive attitude towards philosophical analysis.
Thus far we have seen that Aristotle has a framework for establishing non-univocity. We have not yet determined whether this framework has the broad application Aristotle hopes for it; nor have we even shown that Aristotle is right to claim that a single philosophical concept of any importance is non-univocal. This is because we cannot know whether a given concept is non-univocal before performing an analysis of it; and Aristotle's appeals to difference in signification do not by themselves provide such an analysis. Instead, they presuppose that the accounts, once provided, will reveal difference of signification. So his framework for establishing non-univocity is a framework, and nothing more.
If we assume that Aristotle will in some cases be able to establish nonunivocity, we will have attained a primarily negative result unless we can also show that he can in those same cases establish association and coredependence.1 That is, unless Aristotle can establish that some homonyms associate, homonymy will lack many of the constructive applications which Aristotle presumes it has.
In this chapter, I introduce a framework for establishing coredependence by articulating and defending Aristotle's method for finding unity in multiplicity. I do so in an effort to answer the problems for association and core-dependence we have identified.2 In particular, in this____________________