anomalous pairings. This result, a convincing, moderately powerful, lawlike
regularity in solid support of the hypothesis, is the object that this
investigation has sought. It expands and refines the results of Chapter 4, and
solidifies the conclusion that it is the type of growth, and not simply growth
itself, that determines the nature, timing, and levels of international conflict.
It is clear that a powerful dual relationship links economic growth and
conflict, and that the type of growth determines which aspect of that dual
relationship is active and operating. It is also apparent that foreign direct
investment is a critical independent variable that can determine both the type
of growth and, through the associated growth-conflict relationship, the nature
and level of international conflict.
It seems intuitively possible to do something about foreign direct
investment, and thereby to influence both growth and conflict. While many
nations have done something about FDI, the actions of the nations of the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) are particularly instructive,
since they have also experienced both peace and prosperity.
Structural work of Chenery and Syrquin at the national level implies that
growth decomposition would be a sound basis for dealing with growth in any
analytical context: Hollis B. Chenery &
Moshe Syrquin, Patterns of Development, 1950- 1970 ( London: Oxford University Press, 1975); Hollis B. Chenery &
Moshe Syrquin, Patterns of Development, 1950 to 1983 ( Washington, D. C.: The World Bank, 1989).
Simon Kuznets, Economic Growth and Structure ( New York: W. W. Norton, 1965), 16-23.
Syrquin showed that the benefits of ample uniform data include
an ability to compare cross-country and time-series relationships involving growth, and
the possibility of identifying relationships between them ( Patterns of Development, 1950- 1970, 2).
In Europe the political, social, and first economic revolutions occurred in the
seventeenth, eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries; the second economic revolution
occurred as the Industrial Revolution in the nineteenth century, and the third economic
revolution began in the last half of the twentieth century. In North America, these
same transformations began a few generations later than in Europe, but proceeded
rather faster. Uncolonized Asia ( Japan, Thailand, China) began even later in the
nineteenth century, and has suffered several major interruptions. Colonial Asia, Africa,
and Latin America were powerfully focused in their beginnings of growth by their
various metropoles ( Britain, France, Netherlands, Belgium, Portugal, the United States),
and have stalled or accelerated accordingly. See
Rudolf von Albertini, Decolonization:
The Administration and Future of the Colonies, 1919- 1960 ( London: Holmes & Meier, 1982), for lucid discussions of their respective fates without the expected burden of
Since about 1700 Britain and France have each experienced three periods of
modern economic growth; Germany, Canada, the United States, Japan, Taiwan, Finland, Norway, and Denmark have experienced two periods. Sweden and the Netherlands probably experienced their first MEG periods in the sixteenth and