accompanying inverse growth-conflict relationship. In the amazing world of both multinationals and countries sharing both power and wealth, this unique
political-economic process may be at least a part of the key to sustained
prosperity and general peace.
Collaboration, in addition to competition, among and between national
states and multinational enterprises can bring the full potential of national and
multinational power to bear not only on national interests and corporate
profits, but on the host of insistent problems that continue to vex mankind.
Deliberate management of foreign direct investment by both government and
industry, with deepening political-economic awareness of its effects on both
growth and conflict, may provide the key to the sustainable peace and
prosperity that neither has been able to bring alone.
Richard N. Haass, "Paradigm Lost," Foreign Affairs 74 (January/ February 1995): 43.
M. Castells, "High Technology, Economic Restructuring, and the Urban-
regional Process in the United States," High Technology, Space and Society (Urban Affairs
Annual Reviews), 28 ( 1985): 11-40.
The universe of modern economic growth is barely a sixth of the world's
countries; these results say nothing at all about most of the world's countries and
peoples. The mean correlations presented in Chapter 4 imply only that conflict and
growth are related more often than not; any linkage between them is associational, not
causal. The relationship between types of growth and types of relationships shown in Chapter 4 is a lawlike regularity, not a law.
It is easy to forget that annual growth of 0.8% was seen as virtually impossible
in the seventeenth century. Historical comparisons suggest that countries that began
modern economic growth in the presence of other countries that had already grown,
have grown faster than their predecessors. The first country to experience MEG, Britain shifted toward dynamic growth over more than two centuries. After a century
of annual growth at about 0.3%, from 1780 Britain took 58 years to double real income
per capita, and led the Industrial Revolution ( 1830-1910) with annual growth of about
1.2%. In 1820, as the United States was entering MEG before industrial expansion,
GDP per capita in the United States was about three-quarters that of Britain. Annual
growth of the American economy from 1830 to 1910 was about 1.6% (GDP grew at
4.2%, but population also grew rapidly). From 1839 the United States took only 39
years to double income per capita at about 1.8% annually, and by the 1890s was the
world's richest country. After the Meiji reforms, from 1885, with increasing influences
from the advanced countries of the time, Japan took 34 years to double GDP per capita
at an annual rate of about 2%. From 1966 South Korea, with deliberate solicitation of
FDI, took 11 years to double GDP per capita at about 6.3% annual growth.
"When Nations Play Leapfrog," The Economist, 329 ( 16 October 1993): 84.
In recognizing the separate results of Cattell and Rummel (see section on "Status-
field Theory, Chapter 3) as mutually supporting, the analysis accepts the premise that
domestic conflict is not a significant explanation for international conflict, and may
confidently be omitted from statistical consideration. Raymond B. Cattell, "The Dimensions of Cultural Patterns by Factorization of
National Characters," Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology 64 ( 1949): 443-469;