Bargaining for Supremacy: Anglo-American Naval Collaboration, 1937-1941

By James R. Leutze | Go to book overview

nominally friendly powers fertile grounds for interest seeking, it is also the purpose here to examine carefully this popularly held concept of cooperation. Rather than disappearing, antagonism and rivalry seem to have continued during the entire pre-1942 period; though expressions of hostility and suspicion were muted, competition remained the dominant theme. It was simple matter of growing interdependence. As conditions made independence less possible, a guarded alliance became more practical -- a result that came only with the exchange of many assurances and much maneuvering. During the course of that maneuvering the strident rhetoric of competition was dropped out by the more disarming rhetoric of bargaining.

The most significant change in the relationship came in the spring of 1941, when the British allowed the Americans theoretical supremacy in any wartime alliance that might be established between the two countries. The military situation had deteriorated so badly by March 1941 that the British government was willing to pay that high price to get America into war, development some expected within weeks.2 That situation alone accounts for British willingness to allow the U.S. Navy a major role in the Atlantic/European area with a concomitant increase in America's influence in directing the war. Although they were suspicious of Britain's motives, American military strategists were eager by that time to accept the challenge. The stakes were high: leadership in the wartime coalition, with all that it implied in terms of political, diplomatic, and economic opportunity when peace came.

There is no question that the tone of naval relations between Britain and the United States became less strident, but those relations had been so acrimonious during the first eighteen years after World War I that any increase in trust would have been an improvement. Although the two navies had worked closely in 1917- 1918, there was considerable anti-British sentiment in Washington among U.S. naval officers who bridled at living in the shadow of the Royal Navy and continued to dream of that much-ballyhooed "Navy second to none." At the Admiralty there was so much suspicion of America's ambition that a new naval race seemed imminent. The Washington Conference ( 1921-22), hailed by some as a first step toward a disarmed world, was viewed by the Admiralty as an attempt by the Americans to win by treaty (the Naval Limitation Treaty) what they had failed to win in the shipyards.3

-4-

Notes for this page

Add a new note
If you are trying to select text to create highlights or citations, remember that you must now click or tap on the first word, and then click or tap on the last word.
One moment ...
Default project is now your active project.
Project items
Notes
Cite this page

Cited page

Style
Citations are available only to our active members.
Buy instant access to cite pages or passages in MLA 8, MLA 7, APA and Chicago citation styles.

(Einhorn, 1992, p. 25)

(Einhorn 25)

(Einhorn 25)

1. Lois J. Einhorn, Abraham Lincoln, the Orator: Penetrating the Lincoln Legend (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992), 25, http://www.questia.com/read/27419298.

Note: primary sources have slightly different requirements for citation. Please see these guidelines for more information.

Cited page

Bookmark this page
Bargaining for Supremacy: Anglo-American Naval Collaboration, 1937-1941
Table of contents

Table of contents

Settings

Settings

Typeface
Text size Smaller Larger Reset View mode
Search within

Search within this book

Look up

Look up a word

  • Dictionary
  • Thesaurus
Please submit a word or phrase above.
Print this page

Print this page

Why can't I print more than one page at a time?

Help
Full screen
Items saved from this book
  • Bookmarks
  • Highlights & Notes
  • Citations
/ 330

matching results for page

    Questia reader help

    How to highlight and cite specific passages

    1. Click or tap the first word you want to select.
    2. Click or tap the last word you want to select, and you’ll see everything in between get selected.
    3. You’ll then get a menu of options like creating a highlight or a citation from that passage of text.

    OK, got it!

    Cited passage

    Style
    Citations are available only to our active members.
    Buy instant access to cite pages or passages in MLA 8, MLA 7, APA and Chicago citation styles.

    "Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences." (Einhorn, 1992, p. 25).

    "Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences." (Einhorn 25)

    "Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences." (Einhorn 25)

    "Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences."1

    1. Lois J. Einhorn, Abraham Lincoln, the Orator: Penetrating the Lincoln Legend (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992), 25, http://www.questia.com/read/27419298.

    Cited passage

    Thanks for trying Questia!

    Please continue trying out our research tools, but please note, full functionality is available only to our active members.

    Your work will be lost once you leave this Web page.

    Buy instant access to save your work.

    Already a member? Log in now.

    Search by... Author
    Show... All Results Primary Sources Peer-reviewed

    Oops!

    An unknown error has occurred. Please click the button below to reload the page. If the problem persists, please try again in a little while.