delegations to the Fifth Congress of the CPY which was to commence on July 21, 1948. Rάkosi had suggested that all the parties send
delegations, and attempt to "influence the situation in Yugoslavia," --
that is, denounce the Yugoslav leadership. At the Secretariat's meeting,
however, Suslov stated that "the Central Committee of the CPSU(b)
considers it inexpedient to send delegations to the Fifth Congress of the
82 As a result, not a single Party sent representatives to the
Thus, Moscow was effectively able to isolate and neutralize the
intransigent Yugoslav leadership, and its actions were endorsed by the
Cominform. Although the Corninform-member countries might have
been somewhat gratified to see the Yugoslav leadership dislodged from
its pedestal, they were quailed by its fate, and effectively dissuaded
from diverging from the course charted by the Soviets. With the consent
of all but the Yugoslavs, the Kremlin had forged an organizational
weapon -- the Cominform -- with which to control the Communist
movement and the Soviet Bloc.
On the Yugoslav social and political system see: V. Koštunica and
, Stranački pluralizam ili monizam: Društveni pokreti i politički sistern
u Jugoslaviji 1944-1949, ( Belgrade, 1983); B. Petranović, Politička i ekonomska
osnova narodne vlasti u Jugoslaviji za vreme obnove ( Belgrade, 1969); idem, Istorija Jugoslavije 1918-1988, vol. 3, ( Belgrade, 1988) 29-119. On Yugoslav
foreign policy see: B. Petranović, Istorija, vol. 3, 162-196; L. Ia. Gibianskii, Sovietskii Soiuz i novaia Iugoslavia, 1941- 1947 gg, ( Moscow, 1987), 140-192.
See, e.g., A. A. Zhdanov's report at the ceremonial meeting in Moscow on November 6, 1946, for the 29th anniversary of the October Revolution. Pravda, November 7, 1946; and V. M. Molotov's report at a similar meeting on November
6, 1947, for the 30th anniversary. Pravda, November 7, 1947.
See L. Ia. Gibianskii, Sovietskii Soiuz i novaia Jugoslavia, 140-192.
Arhiv Jugoslavije ( Belgrade), F.507, CK, SKJ (later, AJ-CK SKJ), 1-I/22, l. 18,52; M. Djilas, Viast i pobuna ( Belgrade, 1991) 81-82; Lj. Djurić, Sećanja na ljude
i dogadjaje, ( Belgrade, 1989), 285.
The ambassador also discussed the matter with Tito when he gave him the
telegram. See: Arhiv Josipa Broza Tita (Belgrade), F. Kabinet Maršala Jugoslavije
(henceforth, AJBT-KMJ), I-3-b/634; Arkhiv vneshnei politiki Rossiiskoi