sentative Stephen Solarz during those hearings, Representative Solarz seemed to capture the essence of presidential reporting under the War Powers Resolution by observing, "So far as I can recall, no president in the last fifteen years has ever submitted a notification clearly and unequivocally triggering that requirement [Section 4(a)(1) of the War Powers Resolution]. In the absence of presidential compliance with that provision of the law, we end up in a sort of legal and constitutional 'no man's land,' and nobody seems to think the clock is running. If you try to go to court, as Mr. Weiss and other Members have, you run into problems of standing and political questions."28 Representative Solarz could make the same statement today. Presidents Jimmy Carter, Ronald Reagan, George Bush, and Bill Clinton have used the same phrase, "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," instead of specifically triggering the resolution.
The following two chapters of this book are a departure from the first seven chapters. Since none of the literature has placed the consultation between Congress and the executive in a time line for a given operation, it is hard to judge whether the timing and content of consultation has satisfied the spirit of the War Powers Resolution and the spirit of good faith. Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm have all of the elements of a full-scale "defensive turned offensive" operation requiring U.S. armed forces. We will use that conflict to observe and evaluate whether consultation was timely, informative, and offered in the spirit of complying with the moral obligations of the War Powers Resolution.