Oldest Allies, Guarded Friends: The United States and France since 1940

By Charles G. Cogan | Go to book overview

alliance between the Gaullists and the Communists, there could not have been formed at that time a solid bloc of anti-EDC forces against the will of the United States. For the general, it was his first victory on the world stage in the postwar period, after his self-eviction from power at the beginning of 1946.

In the "Franco-French" context, de Gaulle was the essential victor in the vote of August 30, 1954, which rejected an overpowering supranationality for France. But in the military vein France had to swallow at the end of the year the pill of reinforcement of the military structure of NATO accompanied, in theory at least, by an arms-control regime from which the British were exempted.

Throughout the EDC affair France was regarded in Washington as the key but at the same time not having the right to a favored treatment, unlike Great Britain. The same discrimination appeared in the 1960s in the affair of the Multilateral Force (MLF), a sort of EDC elevated to the nuclear level.

Once having arrived in power, de Gaulle tried to put an end to this British exemption, 77 without success. He then proceeded to undo the existing structures of military integration and at the same time to resist American efforts to strengthen them. Before the end of his tenure he arrived at his goal, taking France out of the integrated military command of NATO while at the same time remaining in the Atlantic alliance as a sort of odd man out. In so doing, de Gaulle finally achieved the theoretical parity (albeit a negative one) that had been lost by the defeat of 1940 but had existed before--particularly during World War I, when France, until near the end of the war, was the superior partner in the Allied camp. And the repeated references of de Gaulle to French grandeur, held up to ridicule, whether through ignorance or not, by Roosevelt and others who followed him, stemmed exactly from this earlier reality of World War I.

It was not very far, at the end of the debate on the EDC, from the collapse of the Fourth Republic. The weakness of the French system, of its "legicentrism," had been exposed time and again. An editorial in Le Monde at the time drew a philosophical lesson of the EDC affair: "As long as France has not been able to provide itself the means of adopting an individual policy [une politique personnelle] on those matters that are for her of vital interest, she should not blame anyone but herself."78

And the day was awaited when someone could impose "une politique personnelle" for "notre dame la France." 79


NOTES
1.
La Grande Nation: term applied to France during the Revolution. La Grande Armée: Napoleon's army.
2.
Statement of June 6, 1952, Charles de Gaulle, Discours et Messages ( Geneva: Editions Edito-Service, 1970), 4:202.
3.
Le Monde, September 1, 1954, 1.

-95-

Notes for this page

Add a new note
If you are trying to select text to create highlights or citations, remember that you must now click or tap on the first word, and then click or tap on the last word.
One moment ...
Default project is now your active project.
Project items

Items saved from this book

This book has been saved
Highlights (0)
Some of your highlights are legacy items.

Highlights saved before July 30, 2012 will not be displayed on their respective source pages.

You can easily re-create the highlights by opening the book page or article, selecting the text, and clicking “Highlight.”

Citations (0)
Some of your citations are legacy items.

Any citation created before July 30, 2012 will labeled as a “Cited page.” New citations will be saved as cited passages, pages or articles.

We also added the ability to view new citations from your projects or the book or article where you created them.

Notes (0)
Bookmarks (0)

You have no saved items from this book

Project items include:
  • Saved book/article
  • Highlights
  • Quotes/citations
  • Notes
  • Bookmarks
Notes
Cite this page

Cited page

Style
Citations are available only to our active members.
Buy instant access to cite pages or passages in MLA, APA and Chicago citation styles.

(Einhorn, 1992, p. 25)

(Einhorn 25)

1. Lois J. Einhorn, Abraham Lincoln, the Orator: Penetrating the Lincoln Legend (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992), 25, http://www.questia.com/read/27419298.

Cited page

Bookmark this page
Oldest Allies, Guarded Friends: The United States and France since 1940
Table of contents

Table of contents

  • Title Page iii
  • Contents v
  • Foreword vii
  • Preface xi
  • Note xii
  • Introduction 1
  • Notes 17
  • 2 - The Falling Out 19
  • Notes 49
  • 3 - The Turning Point 55
  • Notes 71
  • 4 - La Grande Nation, La Grande Armée1 75
  • Notes 95
  • 5 - The Reversal 99
  • Notes 117
  • 6 - The Multilateral Force: The Two Hegemons 121
  • Notes 146
  • 7 - Posthumous Coronation and Détente: The Year of Europe 151
  • Notes 172
  • 8 - Euro-Corps: Return of the Ambivalences 177
  • Notes 195
  • 9 - Epilogue: by Default of Enemies? 199
  • Notes 215
  • Selected Bibliography 219
  • Index 227
  • About the Author 235
Settings

Settings

Typeface
Text size Smaller Larger Reset View mode
Search within

Search within this book

Look up

Look up a word

  • Dictionary
  • Thesaurus
Please submit a word or phrase above.
Print this page

Print this page

Why can't I print more than one page at a time?

Help
Full screen
/ 242

matching results for page

    Questia reader help

    How to highlight and cite specific passages

    1. Click or tap the first word you want to select.
    2. Click or tap the last word you want to select, and you’ll see everything in between get selected.
    3. You’ll then get a menu of options like creating a highlight or a citation from that passage of text.

    OK, got it!

    Cited passage

    Style
    Citations are available only to our active members.
    Buy instant access to cite pages or passages in MLA, APA and Chicago citation styles.

    "Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences." (Einhorn, 1992, p. 25).

    "Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences." (Einhorn 25)

    "Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences."1

    1. Lois J. Einhorn, Abraham Lincoln, the Orator: Penetrating the Lincoln Legend (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992), 25, http://www.questia.com/read/27419298.

    Cited passage

    Thanks for trying Questia!

    Please continue trying out our research tools, but please note, full functionality is available only to our active members.

    Your work will be lost once you leave this Web page.

    Buy instant access to save your work.

    Already a member? Log in now.

    Author Advanced search

    Oops!

    An unknown error has occurred. Please click the button below to reload the page. If the problem persists, please try again in a little while.