Oldest Allies, Guarded Friends: The United States and France since 1940

By Charles G. Cogan | Go to book overview

has with the WEU to remain unaltered, and were an American SACEUR to remain an immutable principle, it would make hollow the concept of a European defense identity.

Eventually, some form of power sharing in the command of military formations in Europe should be worked out between the United States and the European Union. As the American troop draw-down nears completion, both sides must eventually define what is to be their relationship. This definition cannot logically take the form of a deeper, more integrated defense commitment: the ties between the United States and Europe have been and will inexorably continue to loosen, given the disappearance of the Soviet threat. Whatever the outcome, the emergence of a European defense identity is likely to require, over time, transfers of sovereignty and powers on both sides of the Atlantic.


NOTES
1.
Jean Doise and Maurice Vaïsse, Diplomatie et outil militaire ( Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1987), 623.
2.
From a seminar conducted by Gates at the Olin Institute, Harvard University, May 1, 1992.
3.
"French Dilemmas and Strategies in the New Europe," in After the Cold War: International Institutions and State Strategies in Europe, 1989-1991, ed. Joseph Nye, Robert Keohane, and Stanley Hoffmann ( Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993), 130.
4.
Interview with Jacques Andréani, French Ambassador to the United States, June 26, 1992.
5.
French Embassy Press Service, Washington, D.C., text of speech of President Mitterrand, 6.
6.
Alain Rollat, "Jeu de patience à l'Elysée," Le Monde, October 19, 1991, 9.
7.
Frédéric Bozo, La France et l'OTAN ( Paris: Masson, 1991), 195.
8.
Ibid., 196.
9.
Catherine Guicherd, "A European Defense Identity: Challenge and Opportunity for NATO," Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, June 12, 1991, summary page. The European Political Union was the linear successor to (a) the aborted plan to develop a European Political Community alongside the European Defense Community in the 1950s; then (b) the various subsequent plans to develop greater political cohesion, the most prominent of which was the failed Fouchet Plan of the 1960s; and finally (c) the loose, consensus-based mechanism of European Political Cooperation developed in the 1970s (pp. 76-77).
10.
The two conferences were eventually held in December 1990.
11.
Guicherd, "European Defense Identity,"7.
12.
American Embassy telegram no. 4066 to State, July 6, 1990, 2-3.
13.
Le Monde, July 8-9, 1990, 5.
14.
Ibid.
15.
Doise and Vaïsse, Diplomatie et outil militaire, 649.
16.
Less than two weeks after the London Summit, and the image it projected of a more benign and more politically oriented Atlantic alliance, Mikhail Gorbachev gave up

-195-

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Oldest Allies, Guarded Friends: The United States and France since 1940
Table of contents

Table of contents

  • Title Page iii
  • Contents v
  • Foreword vii
  • Preface xi
  • Note xii
  • Introduction 1
  • Notes 17
  • 2 - The Falling Out 19
  • Notes 49
  • 3 - The Turning Point 55
  • Notes 71
  • 4 - La Grande Nation, La Grande Armée1 75
  • Notes 95
  • 5 - The Reversal 99
  • Notes 117
  • 6 - The Multilateral Force: The Two Hegemons 121
  • Notes 146
  • 7 - Posthumous Coronation and Détente: The Year of Europe 151
  • Notes 172
  • 8 - Euro-Corps: Return of the Ambivalences 177
  • Notes 195
  • 9 - Epilogue: by Default of Enemies? 199
  • Notes 215
  • Selected Bibliography 219
  • Index 227
  • About the Author 235
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