ever, the Court's composition had changed to give judicial conservatives numerical dominance, yet the counterrevolution desired by Presidents Reagan and Bush and their supporters did not occur when the moment of opportunity presented itself.
The central argument of this book is that Justice Scalia, the creative, brilliant, and outspoken intellectual leader of the Court's conservative majority, made a pivotal contribution to the failure of the judicial counterrevolution that he so fervently sought to achieve. As subsequent chapters will explain, Scalia's philosophy, behavior, and style made him an ineffective coalition builder within the political decision- making processes of a collegial court in which it takes five votes to establish a new precedent. Within the dynamic mixture of the Rehnquist Court justices' personalities and decision-making processes, Scalia shared with his conservative colleagues similar assessments about case outcomes. However, his strident efforts to push for those outcomes also served to push some of his erstwhile allies toward a moderate stance on key issues that was neither entirely predictable from their judicial philosophies nor consistent with their conservative decisions in other cases.