In concluding, it seems appropriate to consider possible remedies. As a guard against projected worst-case scenarios, one might propose that no amendment could be ratified by the states until first approved by two or three successive Congresses, or until states conducted hearings on the subject of ratification. 134 This, or some similar measure, would expose new amendments to increased publicity and reflection before they could be incorporated into the Constitution. Such worst-case scenarios seem far too unlikely, however, to justify such a change in an already difficult amending process. 135
It is even less likely that the popular conscience could be sufficiently aroused to ratify an amendment to prevent future unamendable amendments. The irony of such a proviso--which, to be effective, would have to be unamendable--would itself be enough to argue against such a change. Moreover, the need for such a change seems dubious, as unamendable amendments do not seem imminent and have never been adopted in more than 200 years of practice.
In the end, then, the arguments surrounding Article V do not so much point to the need for future constitutional reform, as illuminate the nature and wisdom of the existing constitutional document. The Constitution-- and, more specifically, the amending clause--wisely protects liberty by guarding against the transient whims of the majority, while placing its ultimate faith in the consent of the governed. To date, at least, this faith does not appear to have been misplaced.