if the economy fails to improve, ethnic groups clamor increasingly for independence, and Party officials see their privileges continue to erode.
days may well be numbered.
What would be the result of Gorbachev's departure from power as it affects
Soviet intelligence functions? Probably very little, although the loss of Gorbachev's astute, warm public-relations image would make recruitment a bit more
difficult. The recent emphasis on economic and technological espionage would
continue or even increase as the need becomes ever greater. For this, Japan and
the Pacific Rim will loom ever larger, with a consequent slightly lesser attention
paid to the main enemy, the United States, and its Western European allies. Africa (except for South Africa) and the Middle East will also receive less
attention, though their essential ores and minerals will continue to merit a watch
for targets of opportunity when they arise. Involvement in South and Central
America will have little importance other than as an occasional prod to keep the United States off balance in its own backyard. But will there be less of a role
for the KGB? For the foreseeable future, one can rest assured that this powerful
organization will continue to play a pivotal role in the Soviet system.
Oleg Penkovsky, The Penkovsky Papers ( Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1965); John Dziak, Chekisty: A History of the KGB ( New York: Random House, Ballantine, 1988), p. 163. Considerable controversy still swirls about this highly regarded American
spy known as "Ironbark," including whether he was fully genuine (the usual assumption)
or a Soviet plant. The latest, but not the most plausible, theory is that he was indeed a
plant by a faction of the KGB opposed to Khrushchev that wanted an alternative channel
to the United States. Phillip Knightly, The Second Oldest Profession: Spies and Spying
in the Twentieth Century ( New York: Penguin, 1987), pp. 324-25.
Michael Dobbs, "Soviets and Cubans to Give Their Versions of '62 Missile
Crisis," Washington Post, January 9, 1989.
Gorzdievski was spirited out of Moscow, where he had been recalled for "consultation," after Soviet double defector Vitaly Yurchenko tipped off the CIA that he had
come under suspicion.
Howard Kurtz, "Reagan Joke Said to Cause Soviet Alert," Washington Post,
October 12, 1984; Jeffrey T. Richelson, Foreign Intelligence Organizations ( Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1988), p. 258.
At different times in its history the KGB has been called the Cheka (extraordinary
committee), the OGPU, NKVD, MVD, and other names. For convenience, the term KGB is used here even when it may be anachronistic.
The leading work on the KGB structure and functions is
Amy W. Knight, The
KGB: Police and Politics in the Soviet Union ( Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1988).
William Kennedy, Intelligence Warfare: Penetrating the Secret World of Today's
Advanced Technology Conflict ( New York: Crescent, 1987), pp. 8, 204.
Jay Tuck, The T Directorate: How the KGB Smuggles NATO's Strategic Secrets
to Moscow ( New York: St. Martin's Press, 1986); William R. Corson and
Robert T. Crowley
, The New KGB: Engine of Soviet Power ( New York: William Morrow, 1986),