We have seen overenforcement of antitrust in the 1960s which sometimes chilled competition through excessive intervention; we have seen underenforcement of antitrust in the 1980s when enforcers welcomed combinations that destroyed competition. We have seen proposals for industrial planning, which offer managed solutions to the problem of efficiency and progress.
We believe that there is a coherent view of antitrust that can provide a significant alternative to the three accessible models -- pervasive trust in business judgment ( Chicago School), pervasive distrust of bigness (the Warren Court and the 1960s), and industrial planning ( Japan and MITI). In this collection, we have tried to present the intellectual and practical core for such an alternative.
This volume does not offer a single model. It presents no orthodoxy. Indeed, it reflects a give and take, a self-criticism; it conducts its own internal dialogue about its strengths and limits. As Judge Wyzanski said of antitrust in 1953, it does not fit together like "pieces of a jig-saw puzzle"; 1 nor should it.
Rather, what this collection has to offer is a center of gravity built upon law that is informed by economics. We hope that it will provide a useful and realistic source of strength and support for antitrust as it enters in its second century.