Japan as a means of assuring their own financial survival in the post-Cold War era.
Moreover, as the Japanese make use of the enormous inventive civilian capabilities for products that are militarily relevant, U.S. defense companies can tap into them. In this case, Japan's civilian sector can perform some of the R& that can have a desirable effect in the United States. A symbiosis has emerged between the U.S. and Japanese defense industries. The twin military-industrial complexes have become connected, merging some of their finances, products, engineering, management interoperability, corporate interests, and objectives. What this means, among other consequences, is that to the extent Japan imprints Asia with Japan-compatible civilian industries, the United States gains additional access to dual-use technologies originally out from Japan. While governmentto-government technological reciprocity may be more complex and fraught with bottlenecks, firm-to-firm technology sharing may continue independently. Thus a simple two-way flow between the United States and Japan could be enhanced via a thickening network of multiple global sourcing inspired by one or both of the two defense complexes. In Greek mythology the owl of Minerva is supposed to have said, "Wisdom comes only at the end of the day." Only after the day is over, or an era is over, do we understand the true meaning of the events that took place. Such a delayed acknowledgment may not serve global peace and prosperity well. Scholars, policymakers, and ordinary citizens must ponder what will come from the marriage of Japan's military keiretsu with America's military-industrial complex.
For their continued guidance and encouragement, I wish to thank Robert Scalapino and Kenneth Waltz both at the University of California and Chalmers Johnson at the University of California at San Diego. At the White House and the Department of Defense, Karl Jackson, Terkel Patterson, and James Auer provided valuable insights and materials without which this chapter would have been diminished. Both Carl and Charles Bernard at CBC Avionics suggested vital technical evaluations, and Richard Slowey and A. R. Mann at General Dynamics provided generously their time and expertise. In Japan, Seizaburo Sato at Tokyo University and Katsuhisa Yamada, president of Kawasaki Heavy Industries and former director-general at JDA, provided much assistance, as did Tohru Nagamori at NKK, Risaburo Nezu at MITI, and Shiro Nagato and Yoshifumi Fujita at the Defense Agency. The students and faculty at the International Relations Department at San Francisco State, along with my research assistant Kazumi Nei, contributed to the insights of this chapter. All errors of interpretation are mine.