has subjected its strategy to that of civilian leaders; because civilian leaders did
not respond appropriately to early-warning signals from the military; and because the military forces, not civilian authorities, were the victims of the initial
guerrilla attack. Differences in opinion between the civilian and military leadership and within the political leadership itself as to what strategy the government should pursue readily became apparent. The longer Mexico's leadership
delays in attacking serious economic and social problems, the more likely it is
that the military will be called on to resolve violent disputes.
Roderic Ai Camp, Generals in the Palacio: The Military in Modem Mexico ( New
York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 69.
For background, see Edwin Lieuwen, Mexican Militarism ( Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1968).
Emilio Portes Gil, appointed by Congress as the provisional president of Mexico
in 1928, was not a revolutionary general, but a lawyer. He replaced general Alvaro
Obregón, the president-elect, who was assassinated before taking office.
José Luis Piñeyro, Ejército y sociedad en México: Pasado y presente ( Puebla: Universidad Autónomo de Puebla, 1985), p. 56.
Jorge Alberto Loyoza, El Ejército mexicano ( 1911- 1965) ( Mexico: El Colegio de
México, 1970), p. 4.
Roderic Ai Camp, The Making of a Government: Political Leaders in Modern
Mexico ( Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1984), p. 40.
Camp, Generals in the Palacio, p. 67.
Phyllis Greene Walker, The Modern Mexican Military: Political Influence and
Institution Interests in the 1980s, (Master's thesis, American University, 1987), 40.
For example, see Calude E. Welch Jr., No Farewell to Arms? Military Disengagement from Politics in Africa and Latin America ( Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1987), p. 17.
For a discussion of these "residual" roles, see David Ronfeldt, ed., The Modem
Mexican Military: A Reassessment (La Jolla: Center for United States-Mexican Studies,
University of California, San Diego, 1984), pp. 1-31.
George Philip, The Presidency in Mexican Politics ( New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992), pp. 19-63, discusses its implications in considerable detail.
For empirical evidence, see my "Generals and Politicians in Mexico: A Preliminary Comparison", in
Ronfeldt, ed., Modern Mexican Military, p. 136ff.
See, for example, Enrique Alducin Abitia, Los valores de los mexicanos: México
entre la tradición y la modernidad ( México: Fondo Cultural Banamex, 1986), p. 176.
Peter H. Smith, "The 1988 Presidential Succession in Historical Perspective", in Wayne A. Cornelius et al., eds., Mexico's Alternative Political Futures (La Jolla: Center
for U.S.-Mexican Studies, UCSD, 1989), pp. 391-416.
Oscar Hinojosa, "Su voto demonstró que los militares no son homogeneamente
governistas", Proceso, 8 August 1988, p. 19.
For some background, see Alden Cunningham, "Mexico's National Security in
the 1980-1990s", in
Ronfeldt, ed., Modern Mexican Military, p. 167.
Olga Pellicer de Brody, "National Security Concerns in Mexico: Traditional No-"