cratic reform for China. This electoral process may have significant impact on the election of deputies to the people's congress at different levels in the years to come, even though, as I point out in chapter 6, the Chinese leadership will try to separate the two processes for political considerations. A legal profession is developing at this point only in cities, but emphasis on professionalism is both an urban and a rural phenomenon. The reform of state-owned enterprises requires the CCP's total concentration, not only because it involves millions of stateowned-enterprise employees and concerns China's social and political stability but also because the result of this reform will have important bearing on the success of China's overall reform. The CCP will not be able to concentrate on the reform of state-owned enterprises unless the CCP can be sure that rural China is stable. If the prospect of China's development depends on the political economy of the undergoing reform, rural development and developments in all these areas will help to shape the contours of the political economy of the reform.
In conclusion, if policy choices about development are often constrained by national circumstances, domestic structure, and politics and involve trade-offs among desirable ends and if policy choices are often determined by the end of development, by the results of previous policies, and by external and internal pressures, the road ahead, like the road behind, will be spiral.