reason why these governments should expend precious political capital supporting a deployment decision that has not yet been made in the United States.
There also exists, in Europe, clear and unmitigated rejection of SDI and the change in nuclear strategy that it portends. Criticism for SDI has come primarily from the opposition Labour party in Britain, and the opposition Social Democratic party (SDP) in West Germany. Rejection of SDI by these two major opposition parties is based less on the strategic merits or demerits of SDI than on the incompatibility of SDI with their philosophical outlook toward security as a whole. The opposition seems to be rallying around a concept known as the "security partnership" or "common security." As explained above, this approach to security regards as destablizing any unilateral approach or solution toward achieving security. The only approach that will succeed, according to this outlook, is a political one. As the SDP parliamentary group states:
Unlike the Social Democrats, who want to achieve stability, security and defensive capability not through weapons but primarily through dialogue, treaties and confidence building measures, the U.S. President relies on solving a political problem by technical means. This approach never worked in the past, nor will it work in the future.53
The above has been an overview of European reactions to SDI; following chapters will examine in greater detail various Western European criticisms of SDI based on deterrence and arms control grounds. Now we turn to the first ABM debate.