Missile Defenses and Western European Security: NATO Strategy, Arms Control, and Deterrence

By Robert M. Soofer | Go to book overview

from the point of view of irrational use based on the "threat that leaves something to chance."

To be blunt, if the French and British deterrents are insufficient to impose restraint on the Soviet Union (something neither country will ever admit to), then we can plausibly infer that their possible loss due to U.S.-Soviet strategic defenses would have less of an impact on NATO deterrence than the possible gains due to the enhanced credibility of the U.S. strategic nuclear guarantee. In the final analysis, as Keith Payne points out, the enhanced credibility of the U.S. deterrent provided by strategic defenses could "compensate in terms of deterrent effect for the potentially reduced penetrability of British and French nuclear forces.''59


NOTES
1.
Department of Defense, The Theater Nuclear Force Posture in Europe. A report to the U.S. Congress in Compliance with Public Law 93-365, April 1955, 12.
2.
Lawrence Freedman, Britain and Nuclear Weapons ( London: Royal United Services Institute, 1980), 47.
3.
Strategic Nuclear Policy, Defense Subcommittee, 4th Report, Session 1980-81 ( London: HMSO, 1981), XI.
4.
Press Conference, 23 July 1964, Speeches and Press Conferences 208 ( France: Ambassade de France).
5.
Davis S. Yost, France's Deterrent Posture and Security in Europe: Part I, Capabilities and Doctrine, Adelphi Papers 194 ( London: International Institute for Strategic Studies [IISS], Winter 1984-85), 15.
6.
Defense White Paper, 1985 ( New York: German Information Center, 1985), 30.
7.
Ibid, 30.
8.
Defense White Paper, 1983 ( New York: German Information Center, 1983), 142.
9.
See statement by Franz-Josef Strauss, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 3 August 1962 and 9 August 1962.
10.
Der Speigal, reprinted in FBIS, Western Europe, 16 September 1977, J9.
11.
Georg Leber, "Principles Underlying German Defense Policy," Atlantic Community Quarterly, vol. 14, no. 2 (Summer 1976): 221-22.
12.
Ibid, 220.
13.
Report submitted to the SPD Executive Committee by the Working Group on "New Strategies," ( Bonn: July 1983), 16.
14.
"Policy Statement by Chancellor Helmut Kohl to the Bundestag in Bonn on the SDI," 18 April 1985 ( New York: German Information Center, 1985), 6.
15.
"Defense and Security in the Nuclear Age," Text of a speech delivered by the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, Sir Geoffrey Howe, to the Royal United Services Institute, in London, 15 March 1985.
16.
"Mitterrand Adviser Vedrine Discusses Defense," FBIS, Western Europe, 1 February 1985, K4.
17.
Ronald Mason, "Star Wars: An Alternate View," Aerospace America ( July 1984): 24.

-65-

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Missile Defenses and Western European Security: NATO Strategy, Arms Control, and Deterrence
Table of contents

Table of contents

  • Recent Titles in Contributions in Military Studies Series Advisor: Colin Gray ii
  • Title Page iii
  • Contents vii
  • Tables ix
  • Acknowledgments xi
  • Acronyms xiii
  • Introduction 1
  • 1- Western European Reaction to the Strategic Defense Initiative 11
  • Notes 25
  • 2- Western Europe and The First Abm Debate: 1965-72 29
  • Notes 37
  • 3- Sdi and Deterrence: A Western European Perspective 39
  • Notes 65
  • 4- Western European Arms Control Perspectives And Sdi 69
  • Conclusion 83
  • 5- Sdi and Western European Support for The Abm Treaty 87
  • Conclusion 99
  • 6- Antitactical Missile Defense, Western Europe, and the Inf Treaty 103
  • Notes 119
  • 7- Antitactical Missile Defense and Nato Strategy 123
  • Conclusion 142
  • Notes 143
  • 8- Summary and Conclusion 147
  • Bibliography 161
  • Index 171
  • About the Author 175
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