The Eagle and the Peacock: U.S. Foreign Policy toward India since Independence

By M. Srinivas Chary | Go to book overview

resolution the United States was effectively eliminating any chance for an early end to the Korean War. On the other hand, the Truman administration was also under intense domestic pressure to follow a hard line toward Beijing. For Truman, U.S. credibility at home had become a vital consideration.

Sensitive to the views of allies at the United Nations, Truman wanted to restrict the fighting as much as possible. He was displeased with General MacArthur for challenging the administration's Korean policy, including the general's dissatisfaction for not being able to bomb China. The dismissal of MacArthur on 10 April 1951 appeared to the Indian prime minister as an encouraging move by the United States toward temperance and caution. The next six months were spent in achieving a ceasefire and bringing the Korean War to an end.

The Korean conflict remained a decisive event in Cold War history and in the history of Indo-American relations. Specifically it was a disaster for the U.S. relationship with India. For Nehru, the Truman administration had formulated a policy in Korea that failed to comprehend the political implications in Asia and the military consequences of its political decisions. For Truman, he had gone to war because he saw the world and Asia in crisis. He was also concerned with maintaining the international credibility of the United States as well as his own credibility at home.

The Korean War helped to shift America's attention toward the Far East and South Asia. 62 Prior to Korea the only political or military commitment of the United States outside the Western Hemisphere had been the North Atlantic Treaty. But by 1954 the United States was linked by political and military agreements with some twenty countries outside Latin America. Also, the U.S. foreign-assistance program, named the Mutual Security Program, no longer had as its primary purpose economic and social reconstruction but military support for recipient countries. The United States perceived the Communist menace in global terms rather than in terms of Europe alone as had been the case prior to 1950.63

India's self assertion and its constant criticisms of U.S. policy both inside and outside the chambers of the United Nations threatened to undermine or reduce the effectiveness of the U.S. role in Asia. Despite high initial hopes the Truman administration failed to build India as a bastion for the containment of communism in South Asia and Southeast Asia, but the United States was prepared to react to India's challenge against its containment policy in the years to come. This came in the form of the United States forging a military alliance with Pakistan. 64


NOTES
1
Robert J. McMahon, "Toward a Post-Colonial War: Truman Administration policies toward South and Southeast Asia" in Michael J. Lacey, ed., The TrumanPresidency

-85-

Notes for this page

Add a new note
If you are trying to select text to create highlights or citations, remember that you must now click or tap on the first word, and then click or tap on the last word.
One moment ...
Default project is now your active project.
Project items
Notes
Cite this page

Cited page

Style
Citations are available only to our active members.
Buy instant access to cite pages or passages in MLA 8, MLA 7, APA and Chicago citation styles.

(Einhorn, 1992, p. 25)

(Einhorn 25)

(Einhorn 25)

1. Lois J. Einhorn, Abraham Lincoln, the Orator: Penetrating the Lincoln Legend (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992), 25, http://www.questia.com/read/27419298.

Note: primary sources have slightly different requirements for citation. Please see these guidelines for more information.

Cited page

Bookmark this page
The Eagle and the Peacock: U.S. Foreign Policy toward India since Independence
Table of contents

Table of contents

  • Title Page iii
  • Contents v
  • Foreword vii
  • Preface xi
  • Introduction 1
  • Notes 7
  • 1 - Laying the Foundation: Anglo-American Competition and Indian Freedom 9
  • Notes 19
  • 2 - Confronting Turbulent India: Truman and the Indian Famine of 1946 23
  • Notes 33
  • 3 - The Quest for Commerce, Peace, and Prosperity: Truman's Point Four, Mutual Security, and the Grain Deal of 1951 39
  • Notes 50
  • 4 - The Nationalist Challenge: Indian Nonalignment and Indo-American Conflicts 57
  • Notes 67
  • 5 - The End of Optimism: Cold War Comes to South Asia 71
  • Notes 85
  • 6 - Confrontation to Collaboration: U.S.-Pakistan Military Alliance, Trade, and Aid to India 93
  • Notes 107
  • 7 - Promise Fulfilled: The New Frontier, Kennedy, Johnson, and India 113
  • Notes 127
  • 8 - The Limits of Power: The Nixon and Indira Gandhi Challenges 131
  • Notes 142
  • 9 - Principled Pragmatism: Carter, Human Rights, and Indo-American Relations 147
  • Notes 155
  • 10 - Conservative Pragmatism: Reagan and India 159
  • Notes 170
  • Conclusion 173
  • Notes 178
  • Selected Bibliography 179
  • Index 189
  • About the Author *
Settings

Settings

Typeface
Text size Smaller Larger Reset View mode
Search within

Search within this book

Look up

Look up a word

  • Dictionary
  • Thesaurus
Please submit a word or phrase above.
Print this page

Print this page

Why can't I print more than one page at a time?

Help
Full screen
Items saved from this book
  • Bookmarks
  • Highlights & Notes
  • Citations
/ 194

matching results for page

    Questia reader help

    How to highlight and cite specific passages

    1. Click or tap the first word you want to select.
    2. Click or tap the last word you want to select, and you’ll see everything in between get selected.
    3. You’ll then get a menu of options like creating a highlight or a citation from that passage of text.

    OK, got it!

    Cited passage

    Style
    Citations are available only to our active members.
    Buy instant access to cite pages or passages in MLA 8, MLA 7, APA and Chicago citation styles.

    "Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences." (Einhorn, 1992, p. 25).

    "Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences." (Einhorn 25)

    "Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences." (Einhorn 25)

    "Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences."1

    1. Lois J. Einhorn, Abraham Lincoln, the Orator: Penetrating the Lincoln Legend (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992), 25, http://www.questia.com/read/27419298.

    Cited passage

    Thanks for trying Questia!

    Please continue trying out our research tools, but please note, full functionality is available only to our active members.

    Your work will be lost once you leave this Web page.

    Buy instant access to save your work.

    Already a member? Log in now.

    Search by... Author
    Show... All Results Primary Sources Peer-reviewed

    Oops!

    An unknown error has occurred. Please click the button below to reload the page. If the problem persists, please try again in a little while.