of exit (and opponents) provides incumbent regimes an important basis for social power and thus an effective voice in domestic institutions. Second, do incumbent regimes find that institutions give them better opportunities to link issues and, following strategies of reciprocity, to compensate for concerns about relative achievement of gains on some issues with prospects for more favorable sharing of gains on others? Third, do incumbent regimes find that national institutions constitute potentially useful umpires in the process of rearranging the opportunities for the achievement of gains in the face of dissatisfaction with the cooperative arrangements to democratize? Finally, do national institutions permit political groups to develop consensual knowledge of how gains may be distributed under different forms of cooperative arrangements? Can such a development of empirical and theoretical knowledge by domestic institutions allow groups to be more confident that the arrangement they select will foster a relatively low level of political uncertainty?
These are at least some of the questions generated by the possibility that political insecurity generated by democratization exists and acts as an inhibitor of the emergence and maintenance of democratic rule. The incumbent regime is often the political entity that exhibits this condition. Elements of the incumbent regime (the state, the military, and ruling party) in a mutually supportive and symbiotic relationship desire to cling to power for fear of being deprived of their long-held political capabilities.
From this rather specific focus on the reactions of political incumbents and opposition groups to democratization, the next chapter examines the more popular and broader issue of ethnopolitics and its interface with ongoing democratization processes in many African countries.