of Israel voiced by the highest authorities in the Canadian government (including the Secretary of State for External Affairs), as well as the concomitant deterioration in Israel's--and its own--credibility among key political and societal elements. Particularly disturbing was the perceived attempt, unprecedented in Canadian foreign policy, by the government to domesticize the Arab-Israeli conflict and to drive a wedge between various segments of Canadian Jewry (Confidential interviews with CIC officials). Although significantly troubled by these developments (and their possible long-term ramifications for Canadian- Israeli relations), CIC spokesmen were moderately satisfied at the end of December 1988 by the fact that Canada's official policy on the Middle East and the Arab-Israeli conflict remained unchanged. Joe Clark and others may have publicly criticized Israel's actions but no sanctions had been applied. Canadian delegations continued to reject (or abstain from voting on) resolutions overtly critical of Israel or supportive of Palestinian self-determination. And, most important, Canada had not upgraded its relations with the Palestine Liberation Organization (Willmot Interview). This unchanged Canadian policy had the effect of ameliorating somewhat a difficult situation for the Canada-Israel Committee. The situation was obviously less than satisfactory, but not yet desperate. (The CIC's sense of dissatisfaction, of course, increased with the upgrading of Canada- PLO relations in March 1989.)
Based on the criterion of ethnic interest group influence used in this study, the following results are discerned concerning the influence of the Canada-Israel Committee over Canada's Middle East policy between October 1973 and December 1988 (table 6).
The CIC and Canada's Middle East Policy, 1973-1988
|Degree of Influence|
|PLO in Canada||X|