A prediction of the RN subculture hypothesis is that individuals from the subculture will play important roles in the leadership of the nationalist opposition and be highly represented in the rank and file. While this is suggested by the cases I have mentioned, it can be more fully tested by a survey of membership in various national fronts. RN backgrounds were found among nationalist militants in the Basque region and Catalonia (see Pérez-Agote, 1986: 88-98; Zulaika, 1988: 3-15; Johnston, 1991: 54-68). The next step is to gather similar data for nationalisms that mobilized in the final years of the Soviet Union.
Nevertheless, this general survey suggests several tentative points to guide future research:
As in Catalonia, the Basque region, and Poland, the roles of religion and church in several Soviet nationalisms derive from the communist- imposed restrictions on civil life in the context of historical association of church and nation. Where secularization had been advanced prior to subjugation to Soviet rule, the religious aspects of the subculture were diminished. When industrialization and urbanization occurred under coercive socialist development, it appears that the nation-church merger, far from being eradicated by repression and atheistic mobilization, was intensified among some groups. Reasons for this are complex; but at this point they seem to derive from a combination of "orthodox nationalism" preserving the church as a symbol, social-psychological factors deriving from life under authoritarianism, and the social organization of primary ties.
An important factor is the variable treatment the state and party accorded the national churches. It varies according to historical patterns, geopolitical and security factors, regime change and ideology, and factors related to control and mobilization of the local population. In Armenia, extraordinary freedoms were granted to the church by the regime. In Lithuania and the Western Ukraine restrictions were more extreme. There does not, however, seem to be a linear relationship between the freedom given to the national church and its affinity with the nationalist cause.
When the church identifies too closely with the regime, the material and practical advantages it receives may also carry the moral stain of collaboration. Martyrdom aided the severely repressed Uniate church in the Ukraine in its struggle for existence, as it did Lithuanian Catholicism; but complicity with the regime did not seem to damage the place of the Armenian church in the eyes of the population. Whatever symbolic benefits accrue from repression must be balanced by greater organizational and material resources that come with complicity.