CATEGORIES AND JUDGMENTS
'It is to synthesis, therefore, that we must first look to determine the origin of our knowledge' (B 103).
'To put all this in a nutshell, it is first necessary to remind the reader that we are here not talking of the origin of experience, but of what is in it . . .' ( Prol., Sect. 21a. Ak., Vol. 4, p. 304).
IT is obvious enough that in the Metaphysical Deduction Kant identifies certain concepts as categories, and something has been already said about the non-committal nature of this claim (Ch. 6). If it is held that in the Metaphysical Deduction Kant finally establishes that his chosen concepts have all the properties that categories are supposed to have, then the argument will seem inevitably defective. But if the chosen concepts are regarded instead as candidates for categorial status, then the argument has at least some hope of success. In this case the whole passage is designed to give grounds for, and explanations of, the list of candidate categories which terminates it. Unfortunately neither the grounds nor the explanations are at all clearly expressed. Throughout the section Kant contrives, even more successfully than usual, to condense his argument to the point of assertion. This means that much of the discussion can be only guided, and not dictated, by Kant's own words. There are two points at which the discussion will deviate from Kant's own exposition. Appeals will sometimes be made to the later arguments of the Schematism, and the passages which introduce the Analytic of Principles (B 169-202). The reason for this is that the later passage contains further elaboration