THE FIRST AND SECOND ANALOGIES
'For this concept (cause) makes strict demand that something, A, should be such that something else, B, follows from it necessarily, and in accordance with an absolutely universal rule' (B 124).
'If, therefore, wax, which was formerly hard, melts, I can know a priori that something must have preceded, upon which the melting followed according to a fixed law, although a priori . . . I could not determine . . . either the cause from the effect, or the effect from the cause' (B 704).
THERE are many different ways in which Kant's argument in the Analogies may be presented. They are all nevertheless directed towards revealing the connection between the categories of relation and certain time discriminations. In the first two Analogies, to be considered here, Kant deals with a range of inter-connected concepts, such as 'substance', 'cause', 'alteration', 'change', 'persistence', 'succession', 'state', 'event', and others. There is no single way of correctly depicting these relations between such concepts, although, no doubt, there are many incorrect ways of so doing. Kant may be understood as analysing the schematised categories of 'cause' or 'substance', or as indicating how the pure concepts associated with these categories operate in our spatiotemporal experience, or again, as analysing what is involved in our conventional discriminations between alterations, states, or events. The aim common to these different approaches to the argument is that of showing how the categories are required for, or make possible, certain discriminations in our experience.