have been the product of an excellent education system. As such, he would have been quite productive and very trainable. If, for one reason or another, he was still let go, he would have had access to a nationwide database of available jobs. He probably could have found a job quite quickly without having to go through all of the pain he described.
If necessary, his state job service agency could even have offered a training subsidy to an employer who agreed to hire him, thus further speeding his return to work and helping ensure that his value to this employer or another was such that he would have few unemployment episodes in the future.
Once at work, our friend's productivity and thus value to the company may have been further enhanced through his participation in a labor- management cooperative effort. His real wages and thus his standard of living could rise faster than otherwise would have been possible as the result of not only how productive he was but also how productive his company was and the entire economy were. This enhanced productivity would have been at least partly the result of a system of government regulations that carefully and effectively weighed the costs and benefits of each regulation and refused to impose unnecessary costs on business.
A high NAIRU costs the U.S. economy too much. It can, as outlined in this book, be effectively reduced without risking an acceleration of inflation. Let us not follow the example of some European countries that have found higher and higher levels of unemployment necessary to stabilize inflation. The costs of using unemployment to control inflation are too high, and we have other tools we can employ that will enable both lower unemployment and stable inflation. Some evidence already exists that because of changes in social welfare programs, declines in labor union power, and increases in productivity, the U.S. NAIRU has begun to come down. Let us hasten its decline.