tations serve to expand and clarify interpretations of that document as well as to initiate and signal changes in the nation's more embracive (lowercase c) constitution. Given the judiciary's long-standing claim "to say what the law is" 45 there is wisdom in Woodrow Wilson's observation that the Supreme Court constitutes "a kind of Constitutional Convention in continuous session" 46 and in Mason and Stevenson's claim that "one could memorize the written document word for word," but that, without knowledge of the judicial gloss on the Constitution, "still know little or nothing of its meaning." 47
Scholars increasingly recognize that the judiciary is not the sole expositor of the written Constitution, and the courts certainly have no monopoly over influencing and interpreting the nation's lowercase c constitution. Consistent with the representative character of American government and the Constitution's emphasis on elections, although theirs may not always be the final word, the elected branches are responsible for initiating many such changes. These branches initiate such changes via presidential orders and directives as well as congressional legislation. 48
Except perhaps in introductory American government textbooks, discussions of lawmaking, of judicial review, and of constitutional amendment generally proceed independently, and each is certainly complicated enough to be so treated. In treating these processes in that fashion, however, the elusive relationships among these processes, and their overall impact on change, may be slighted. Accordingly, in the pages that follow this author will examine each of these mechanisms as an engine of constitutional change, compare their relative merits and demerits, examine how these findings bear on existing theories of constitutional change, and ascertain what, if any, implications these findings have on the adequacy of the current formal process of constitutional amendment and the desirability of pursuing changes through this or through alternate routes.