man's and Lipkin's theories apply fairly well to certain periods of U.S. history. Both writers seem, however, to have described one method for change and portrayed it as exclusive.
Lutz, Levinson, Munzer and Nickel, and Suber may have come closest to recognizing that constitutional changes do not necessarily follow a preset pattern but may be instituted in a variety of ways, each of which influences the others. Their theories also suggest that it may be more appropriate to institute some changes through one mechanism rather than through others, but, no one as yet appears to have fashioned a comprehensive theory of which kinds of changes are best instituted through each mechanism.
Rather than aim for such a grand theory, this author has decided to try an alternate and more empirical tack. He begins with the premise, somewhat contrary to that of Stephen Markman and Robert Lipkin, that, historical practice having been what it has been, there are three relatively well-established means of initiating constitutional change in the United States and that, at least in some circumstances, each is legitimate. He further posits that each of these mechanisms has certain strengths and weaknesses and that a comparison of these strengths and weaknesses is most likely to lead, at least tentatively, to a consideration of when each mechanism for change is most appropriate. This is the task of the next chapter.