Stepping Back: Nuclear Arms Control and the End of the Cold War

By William B. Vogele | Go to book overview

time represent positions that are relatively closer or further away from the positions of bargaining partner (including the possibility of no change). Unfortunately, the recent nature of the negotiations under study here prevents access to document that would allow something like a rigorous, formal coding of verbatim transcripts, such as employed in studies by P. Terrence Hopmann and others. 41 Nevertheless, it is possible to reconstruct fairly accurately the pattern of exchanges from the documents and accounts available and then to make reasonable qualitative classifications.

The next chapter presents the theoretical framework of bargaining strategies and cooperation that is the core of the book. The discussion presents alternative models for bargaining strategies and compares their theoretical bases. The chapter also draws the linkages between bargaining strategies and the international and domestic negotiating environments.

Chapter 3 begins a series of analytical narratives of the negotiating efforts to control nuclear testing and to limit or reduce strategic forces. U.S.-Soviet negotiations to limit nuclear weapons testing and to control strategic nuclear arsenals from 1954 through 1980 are discussed in separate chapters within the framework of the three approaches to arms control bargaining. These negotiating histories provide narrative accounts of the bargaining and provide both the historical and political background for negotiations of the 1980s.

During the first thirty-five years of arms control negotiations, reciprocal bargaining behavior was most productive in moving negotiations to an agreement. Nevertheless, neither side employed a strict tit-for-tat approach--neither concessions nor retractions necessarily were matched right away. Successful bargaining, in other words, was "nicer" or more "forgiving" than the strategy promoted by cooperation theory. Although initiatives had some utility, their impacts were limited. Tough strategies, on the other hand, resulted in neither agreements nor the achievement of major advantages in the arms competition.

Turning to the arms control negotiations of the 1980s, individual chapters analyze efforts to reach a test ban agreement, the negotiations on intermediate- range nuclear forces, and the strategic arms reduction talks. The first set of efforts made little progress and failed to reach an agreement. The other two sets of talks, however, concluded with remarkable achievements. But the road to these achievements was anything but direct. And the bargaining experience differed as much from the past as did the agreements. Because the agreements of the 1980s were reached by such different bargaining strategies, these negotiations offer valuable insights into bargaining theories. The book concludes with a discussion of the role of bargaining in these nuclear negotiations and in the transformations of politics that marked the end of the cold war.


NOTES
1.
Bernard Bechhoefer, Postwar Negotiations for Arms Control ( Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1961), p. 5 98).

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Stepping Back: Nuclear Arms Control and the End of the Cold War
Table of contents

Table of contents

  • Title Page iii
  • Contents vii
  • Acknowledgments ix
  • Abbreviations xi
  • 1 - Security, Cooperation, and Arms Control 1
  • Notes 13
  • 2 - Bargaining and Cooperation 17
  • Notes 30
  • 3 - Controlling Nuclear Testing: 1954-1980 35
  • Notes 45
  • 4 - Negotiating Limits on Nuclear Testing: 1981-1992 47
  • Notes 62
  • 5 - Negotiating Limits on Strategic Nuclear Forces: 1954-1980 67
  • 6 - Negotiating the 1987 Treaty on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces 89
  • Notes 100
  • 7 - Strategic Arms Reduction Talks: 1982-1991 105
  • Notes 130
  • 8 - Stepping Back from the Cold War 135
  • Notes 148
  • Selected Bibliography 151
  • Index 161
  • About the Author 167
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