Stepping Back: Nuclear Arms Control and the End of the Cold War

By William B. Vogele | Go to book overview

years later, Herbert Scoville, a nuclear scientist and former negotiator, made a stronger case, arguing that Charles Osgood's perception of the incapacity for negotiations to seriously constrain the nuclear arms competition had become a prediction fulfilled many times over. He stated,

An effective policy of reciprocal national restraint does not necessarily lead to a formal arms control agreement. Our objective is not to have arms control agreements; it is to make nuclear war less likely. Nevertheless, reciprocal national restraint should not mean that more formal commitments should be foregone. In fact, such restraint can be seen as a valuable first step in facilitating the eventual achievement and ratification of arms control treaties. No longer will arms programs be barreling ahead while negotiators are securing all the details that must be sought in a formal treaty. 51

Scoville suggested some specific steps as illustrations for his argument, including a ban on flight tests of missiles with multiple warheads, a halt to nuclear testing, and restraint of activities that undermine the 1972 ABM treaty. 52


NEGOTIATIONS AND STRATEGIES

In the narrative accounts of U.S.-Soviet nuclear arms control efforts that follow, the patterns of exchanges within the negotiations provide the primary means of "testing" the prescriptions and predictions of bargaining strategies. The interest is to determine empirically whether the process of bargaining that led to success or failure supports any of the presumed strategies. Because this method of analysis relies on establishing correlations between strategies and outcomes, any claims of causality must be cautious. Nevertheless, the enterprise serves two important purposes. First, the strategies do predict patterns of behavior--follow strategy X and behavior Y will happen. The causal logic of the strategies themselves is not always strong, but each suggests a distinctive bargaining relationship. Second, few analyses of arms control efforts attempt to provide a comparative empirical account of several negotiations. This effort is much more valuable for assessing the relative strengths of negotiating strategies because it illustrates the variety of experiences with negotiations.

The narrative chapters on the negotiations of the 1980s are preceded by a historical summary of the relevant negotiations that had already taken place. These chapters are provided as background, although each necessarily offers only an abbreviated picture. However, each also reveals the background patterns of bargaining and negotiation that set the stage for the more recent efforts.


NOTES
1.
This discussion follows closely on Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy ( Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984).

-30-

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Stepping Back: Nuclear Arms Control and the End of the Cold War
Table of contents

Table of contents

  • Title Page iii
  • Contents vii
  • Acknowledgments ix
  • Abbreviations xi
  • 1 - Security, Cooperation, and Arms Control 1
  • Notes 13
  • 2 - Bargaining and Cooperation 17
  • Notes 30
  • 3 - Controlling Nuclear Testing: 1954-1980 35
  • Notes 45
  • 4 - Negotiating Limits on Nuclear Testing: 1981-1992 47
  • Notes 62
  • 5 - Negotiating Limits on Strategic Nuclear Forces: 1954-1980 67
  • 6 - Negotiating the 1987 Treaty on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces 89
  • Notes 100
  • 7 - Strategic Arms Reduction Talks: 1982-1991 105
  • Notes 130
  • 8 - Stepping Back from the Cold War 135
  • Notes 148
  • Selected Bibliography 151
  • Index 161
  • About the Author 167
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