Stepping Back: Nuclear Arms Control and the End of the Cold War

By William B. Vogele | Go to book overview

tems, as signed on May 26, 1972. The extraordinary events referred to in Article [XVII] of this Treaty also include events related to the withdrawal by one of the Parties from the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, or related to its material breach. 82

In this sense, the United States achieved its objective of preserving SDI from any explicit limitations either in START or in a separate treaty. On the other hand, the Soviets were equally clear that they considered extensive development and deployment of SDI by the United States grounds for leaving the START treaty. Whether this posture was a bluff that could be called by an American administration determined to proceed with new strategic defenses was never tested.


NOTES
1.
See text of the START Treaty, Arms Control Today 22 ( November 1991), special supplement.
2.
See "Factfile: Comparisons of U.S. and Soviet Nuclear Cuts," Arms Control Today 22 ( November 1991): 27-28; also texts of speeches by George Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev in Arms Control Today 22 ( October 1991): 3-6.
3.
See "Summary of START II Treaty," Arms Control Today 23 ( February 1993).
4.
See Douglas C. Waller, Congress and the Nuclear Freeze Movement: An Inside Look at the Politics of a Mass Movement ( Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1987), pp. 21-73; Pam Solo, From Protest to Politics ( Cambridge, MA: Ballinger, 1987).
5.
Strobe Talbott, Deadly Gambits ( New York: Knopf, 1984), pp. 222-233.
7.
Bernard Gwertzman, "Reagan Calls for Dramatic Slash in Nuclear Arms," New York Times, 1 April 1982: A1.
8.
"Text of President Reagan's Address on Nuclear Policy and East-West Issues," New York Times, 10 May 1982: A14.
9.
See Talbott, Deadly Gambits, pp. 233-277.
10.
Lloyd Jensen, Bargaining for National Security ( Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1988), p. 210.
11.
Leslie H. Gelb, "U.S. Forging New Concept to Curb Strategic Arms," New York Times, 2 May 1982: A16.
12.
Talbott, Deadly Gambits, p. 297; Leslie H. Gelb, "Offer By Moscow to Curb Bombers and Missiles Cited," New York Times, 1 August 1982: A1.
13.
William Beecher, "U.S. Weighing Modification in Arms Stance," Boston Globe, 7 January 1983: A1.
14.
"Arms Negotiators Return to Geneva," New York Times, 1 February 1983: A8.
15.
Kerry M. Kartchner, Negotiating START: Strategic Arms Reduction Talks and the Quest for Strategic Stability ( New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1991), p. 106.
17.
Alton Frye, "Strategic Build Down: A Context for Restraint," Foreign Affairs 62 (Winter 1983/ 1984): 293-317.
18.
Kartchner, Negotiating START, p. 106; Talbott, Deadly Gambits, pp. 333-342.

-130-

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Stepping Back: Nuclear Arms Control and the End of the Cold War
Table of contents

Table of contents

  • Title Page iii
  • Contents vii
  • Acknowledgments ix
  • Abbreviations xi
  • 1 - Security, Cooperation, and Arms Control 1
  • Notes 13
  • 2 - Bargaining and Cooperation 17
  • Notes 30
  • 3 - Controlling Nuclear Testing: 1954-1980 35
  • Notes 45
  • 4 - Negotiating Limits on Nuclear Testing: 1981-1992 47
  • Notes 62
  • 5 - Negotiating Limits on Strategic Nuclear Forces: 1954-1980 67
  • 6 - Negotiating the 1987 Treaty on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces 89
  • Notes 100
  • 7 - Strategic Arms Reduction Talks: 1982-1991 105
  • Notes 130
  • 8 - Stepping Back from the Cold War 135
  • Notes 148
  • Selected Bibliography 151
  • Index 161
  • About the Author 167
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