suggestion is for the superpowers to waive for a period of ten years their
rights under Article XV (i.e., the right to give notice and withdraw from
the treaty). This, too, is judged by the United States as a Soviet ploy designed
to deny it the option of deploying SDI.
During the Washington Summit in December 1987, the superpowers confirmed once again their desire to hang on to the ABM treaty a while longer
but, they hope, not for very long. They did this by using the most ambiguous
language ever in their final communiqué. Evidence also the title of a space
treaty proposed by the United States soon after the summit: Treaty between
the United States and the Soviet Union on Certain Measures to Facilitate
the Cooperative Transition to the Deployment of Future Strategic Ballistic
A principal goal of the INF treaty was to convey to the world an aura of
arms control momentum. The treaty addressed none of the critical arms control
issues of the day, left the strategic arsenals of the superpowers intact, and even
allowed the removal and reuse of the nuclear warheads from the delivery vehicles
that were eliminated. See also
George F. Will, "Is This Arms Control?" Washington
Post, September 24, 1987.
Office of Press Secretary, The President's Report to the Congress on Soviet Noncompliance with Arms Control Agreements ( Washington, DC, January 23, 1984), and subsequent reports.
Kenneth L. Adelman, Is Arms Control at a Dead End? Current Policy no. 837 ( Washington, DC: Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, May 16, 1986).
The SALT 11 proportionate response decision of May 1986, which in effect
killed the SALT 11 treaty, was defended by the United States exclusively on the Soviet
record of arms treaty noncompliance.
U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Annual Report to the Congress,
1987 ( Washington, DC: U.S. ACDA, February 24, 1988), pp. 69-71; and
Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Soviet Noncompliance with Arms
Control Agreements: The President's Report to the Congress, Special Report no.
175 ( Washington, DC, December 2, 1987), pp. 2-3.
U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Soviet Noncompliance
with Arms Control Agreements, p. 6.
In line with their policy of greater openness, the Soviets have been easing
some of their formerly very restrictive rules governing travel to sensitive military
areas. Thus on September 5, 1987, a U.S. congressional delegation was allowed to
inspect the radar facility in Krasnoyarsk; a month later another U.S. delegation was
permitted to visit and observe the Soviet chemical facility at Shikhany.
Listed in U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Arms Control and
Disarmament Agreements: Texts and Histories of Negotiations ( Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1982).