The Great Transition: American-Soviet Relations and the End of the Cold War

By Raymond L. Garthoff | Go to book overview

4 Wary Exploration of
Improved Relations, 1984

JANUARY 1984 marked the beginning of President Ronald Reagan's campaign for reelection, a dominating element in foreign as well as domestic policymaking. Reagan himself, and at least as important, the triumvirate of White House advisers--Edwin Meese, James Baker, and Michael Deaver--were therefore responsive when in mid-December George Shultz proposed a major address by the president laying out the lines of American policy toward the Soviet Union as it would be depicted for the year ahead, including the election campaign. The KAL incident, the Soviet walkout from the arms control talks on intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) and strategic arms reduction (START), and the virtual breakdown in high-level communication with the Soviet leaders would be swept aside and overtaken by a new presidential declaration of readiness to "meet the Soviets halfway." In addition, Reagan was concerned, if uncomprehending, over the intelligence reports of serious high-level alarm in Moscow in late 1983 about the possibility of an American attack, and he wanted to reaffirm American determination to reduce the risk of war, while remaining strong.1


Reagan's New Metoric

Reagan's speech was delivered on January 16, 1984. The speech was drafted mainly in the State Department, consistent with National Security

____________________
1
Late in 1983, and again in early 1984, Reagan was advised by Director of Central Intelligence William Casey that the NATO exercise Able Archer in November 1983, which simulated nuclear release procedures, had caused genuine alarm in the KGB and presumably in other upper reaches of the Soviet leadership ( Casey was relying mainly on information supplied by double-agent Oleg Gordievsky; see chapter 3). President Reagan alluded indirectly to this event in his memoir, where he admits being surprised to have learned that the Soviet leaders were genuinely afraid of an American attack. See Ronald Reagan, An American Life ( Simon and Schuster, 1990), pp. 588-89.

-142-

Notes for this page

Add a new note
If you are trying to select text to create highlights or citations, remember that you must now click or tap on the first word, and then click or tap on the last word.
One moment ...
Default project is now your active project.
Project items
Notes
Cite this page

Cited page

Style
Citations are available only to our active members.
Buy instant access to cite pages or passages in MLA 8, MLA 7, APA and Chicago citation styles.

(Einhorn, 1992, p. 25)

(Einhorn 25)

(Einhorn 25)

1. Lois J. Einhorn, Abraham Lincoln, the Orator: Penetrating the Lincoln Legend (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992), 25, http://www.questia.com/read/27419298.

Note: primary sources have slightly different requirements for citation. Please see these guidelines for more information.

Cited page

Bookmark this page
The Great Transition: American-Soviet Relations and the End of the Cold War
Table of contents

Table of contents

Settings

Settings

Typeface
Text size Smaller Larger Reset View mode
Search within

Search within this book

Look up

Look up a word

  • Dictionary
  • Thesaurus
Please submit a word or phrase above.
Print this page

Print this page

Why can't I print more than one page at a time?

Help
Full screen
Items saved from this book
  • Bookmarks
  • Highlights & Notes
  • Citations
/ 834

matching results for page

    Questia reader help

    How to highlight and cite specific passages

    1. Click or tap the first word you want to select.
    2. Click or tap the last word you want to select, and you’ll see everything in between get selected.
    3. You’ll then get a menu of options like creating a highlight or a citation from that passage of text.

    OK, got it!

    Cited passage

    Style
    Citations are available only to our active members.
    Buy instant access to cite pages or passages in MLA 8, MLA 7, APA and Chicago citation styles.

    "Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences." (Einhorn, 1992, p. 25).

    "Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences." (Einhorn 25)

    "Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences." (Einhorn 25)

    "Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences."1

    1. Lois J. Einhorn, Abraham Lincoln, the Orator: Penetrating the Lincoln Legend (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992), 25, http://www.questia.com/read/27419298.

    Cited passage

    Thanks for trying Questia!

    Please continue trying out our research tools, but please note, full functionality is available only to our active members.

    Your work will be lost once you leave this Web page.

    Buy instant access to save your work.

    Already a member? Log in now.

    Search by... Author
    Show... All Results Primary Sources Peer-reviewed

    Oops!

    An unknown error has occurred. Please click the button below to reload the page. If the problem persists, please try again in a little while.