to indulge in an unusual trade and to make excessive profits by reason of the existence of the war.
In the last twelve years the theory has been widely promulgated that the new international order expressed in the League Covenant and in the Kellogg Pact has rendered obsolete the classic law of neutrality in time of war. This doctrine is supported by weighty authority, both official and unofficial. The Labour government of Great Britain in 1929 published a memorandum giving the reasons which had moved it to sign the Optional Clause, and in this document it is explicitly stated that neutrality as between members of the League is no longer possible. Responsible American statesmen have drawn similar inferences from the terms of the Kellogg Pact. The same theory has found much favor among a host of private writers, including such a distinguished publicist as Mr. Wickham Steed.
Notwithstanding this formidable array of authority, I know that I have the support of many students of international law in expressing the opinion that the old law of neutrality still stands. That is essentially a question of law, but it is one for which the reasons can be stated without undue technicality. Furthermore, I will venture to express the view, which is a question of policy, that the law of neutrality is sound in principle and beneficial to the world.
Let us turn to the documents. It may be admitted at once that the text of the Covenant, if read literally and without reference to the subsequent practice, seems to be wholly inconsistent with neutrality, at least in those cases which involve the application of sanctions under Article 16. By this Article the member states apparently____________________