out, the difference between profit and loss is often reckoned. All states in the Union would be affected. The squeeze would be greatest in the East, and the squeeze would, of course, be reflected in protests to the senators to do something about it:
The picture I am painting of America enduring a genuine (i.e. airtight) neutrality is pretty spartan. It is predicated, of course, upon a general war outside. Only such a war would call for the adumbrated insulation. This is the type of war, however, which is envisaged by the pro-neutrals in the Senate. They are looking beyond Ethiopia versus Italy. If a war were limited to these two the losses involved in genuine neutrality would be minor and the denial of profits equally minor. Sacrifice would be involved in a bigger war. Even if it were not a general war, a bigger war would find the belligerents engaged in preventing shipments of American goods to the enemy. And it is this kind of argument that the pro-neutrals would avoid by accepting the belligerents' contraband list. Such a list would, obviously, be pretty wide. If American diplomacy did not insist upon any "free goods," it would be all-inclusive. That is to say, no trade would be allowed, since the belligerents could assert (a) that all imports by an enemy state were useful for war purposes; (b) that exports to another neutral state were destined for reexport to the enemy. This is a rough idea of what airtight neutrality would mean in the shape of sacrifice.
Aggressor nations, dominated by mad leaders whose thirst for power leads them to attempt to reproduce the conquests of Caesar in the modern world, must be restrained. If other methods fail, the use of force on