placed Meinertzhagen in an awkward position within Allenby's command and, as a consequence, his superiors routinely rejected many of his recommendations.
As a political officer, however, Meinertzhagen had a direct reporting channel to the Foreign Office, whereas his military superiors reported to the War Office. Outraged by British complicity in the Jerusalem riot, on April 14 Meinertzhagen undertook to communicate his views on the matter directly to Lord Curzon, who had replaced Balfour as foreign secretary, and who received his memorandum while at San Remo. He informed Curzon that he had received ample warning about the forthcoming riot and had advised both Allenby and Bols about it. Moreover, he had warned them that another official of the military administration, Waters-Taylor, had been surreptitiously encouraging Haj Amin al-Husseini and Aref al-Aref to stir up trouble. Neither Allenby nor Bols took any measures to prevent the outbreak. Meinertzhagen told Curzon: "The officers of the Administration are, almost without exception, anti-Zionist in their views. . . . I am convinced that if our British Administration were imbued with an understanding of and sympathy for Zionism which your Lordship has a right to expect, the risk of anti-Jewish riots might have been minimized, if not altogether avoided."35
Curzon and Lloyd George were sufficiently influenced by Meinertzhagen's memorandum to conclude that it was time to replace the military administration by a civil government under a high commissioner. The memorandum also ended Meinertzhagen's career on Allenby's staff.