30, fighting had stopped and the revolution was victorious, but the Soviet leadership decided to send in huge reinforcements to subdue the Hungarians.
Imre Nagy declared the abolition of the one-party state. A new coalition government was formed under his leadership that included representatives of former political parties that had been suppressed by the communists. General Pal Maleter (see Maleter, Pal) was appointed minister of defense, and Miklos Vasarhelyi was named minister of information. General Bela K. Kiraly, freshly out of hospital and prison, was appointed to head the new national guard, composed of soldiers, policemen and revolutionaries. Sandor Kopacsi (see Kopacsi, Sandor) was appointed deputy commander of the guard. By November 3, the government was in complete control of the situation. On November 3, Janos Kadar fled to the city of Szolnok on a Soviet tank, where, on the following day, he declared the formation of a new government under Soviet auspices. Simultaneously, huge Soviet forces attacked the city of Budapest and other centers of the revolution. The Soviet Union sent 2,000 tanks and 150,000 motorized infantry to subdue the Hungarians. Fighting continued until December. By January, about 200,000 Hungarians had fled to Austria. The revolution was over.
Kadar's counterrevolutionary government took over and, for a time, reestablished the Stalinist system in Hungary. His vengeance against the population was terrible. Hundreds were executed with or without trial, and tens of thousands were incarcerated. The terror lasted until 1963, when the regime felt secure enough to relax its pressure on the population.
Arendt Hanna, "Reflections on the Hungarian Revolution," Journal of Politics 20.1 ( February 1958); Fejto François, Behind the Rape of Hungary ( New York, 1957); Kecskemeti Paul, The Unexpected Revolution: Social Forces in the Hungarian Uprising ( Stanford, CA, 1961); Kiraly Bela K., The First War Between Socialist States ( New York, 1984); Lasky Melvin J., ed. The Hungarian Revolution ( New York, 1957); Lomax Bill, Hungary 1956 ( London, 1976). Meray Tibor, Thirteen Days That Shook the Kremlin ( New York, 1959); Molnar Miklos , Budapest, 1956: A History of the Hungarian Revolution ( London, 1971); United Nations Report of the Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary ( New York, 1957); Vali Ferenc, Rift and Revolt in Hungary ( Cambridge, MA, 1961).
Salami Tactics. Between 1945 and 1947, the Hungarian communists conducted a relentless campaign for the dismemberment of the moderate government coalition, led by the Smallholders party. Popular politicians of that party were singled out one by one, and they were relentlessly assailed as "reactionaries" or "enemies of the people." This was the infamous salami tactics boasted about by Matyas Rakosi (see Rakosi, Matyas). By mid-1945, the politicians of the pre-World War II regime were either in jail or in exile in the West. Many of them were anti-Nazi, but they were also anticommunist. Many of them were charged with crimes they never committed.
The tactics worked. In 1946, the moderate right of the Smallholders party, led by Dezso Sulyok, Sandor Kis, and others, was eliminated. They were charged with the "crime" of insufficient enthusiasm for "Soviet help" in restoring Hungary's "sover-