held in 1958, PAX was allowed to run candidates in 300 districts. Piasecki issued two ideological statements under the titles of Polish patriotism and An Ideological guide. His proposal amounted to communism without Marxism. He emphasized the socialist character of PAX and stressed the alliance with the Communist party, but he rejected materialism as the guide to his ideology and declared that PAX was continuing Polish national traditions. He called on the communists to broaden the base of the dictatorship of the proletariat by including the "progressive Catholic movement" in the governing alliance. He promised that PAX would continue doing all it could to become a formal ally of the Communist party. In short, he wanted to be included in the government.
In 1961, however, the winds changed once again. The government began to restrict the economic activities of PAX. Its tax privileges were withdrawn reducing its profits by half. Its political activities were also curtailed and only three PAX deputies were seated in parliament There were several reasons for these steps. A strong group within the Communist party's highest leadership disliked Piasecki and his organization. They observed that Piasecki's frantic efforts to expand the membership rolls of PAX had failed. Cardinal Wyszynski refused to have anything to do with the group, and the Catholic masses followed the cardinal's directions. Piasecki himself became an irritant from an asset for Gomulka, and his high aspirations were not supported by a sizable following. All this, however, did not dampen Piasecki's zeal. He continued to issue statements attacking Cardinal Wyszynski's position in almost anything and blamed the Polish episcopate for the lack of cooperation between the church and the communists.
In the fall of 1964, there was a new crisis between state and church in Poland. PAX attacked the Cardinal once again, accusing him of confusing his position of bishop with that of a politician. It demanded that the Catholic hierarchy recognize the benefits of the communist economic system for the country. In consequence, PAX was able to seat five deputies in parliament the following year. However, Piasecki lost much of his value for the communists. PAX was, therefore, quietly relegated to the background, Piasecki, the realist, went too far in appeasing the Soviet leaders, and he eventually endangered Polish national interests. He was being considered by most people as a Quisling. After 1965, his political ambitions and participation in political life in Poland had come to an end.
Bromke Adam, Poland's Politics: Idealism vs Realism ( Cambridge, MA, 1967); Ramet Pedro , ed. Religion and Nationalism in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe ( New York, 1990); Shneiderman Stephen L., The Warsaw Heresy ( New York, 1959).
Polish Elections in 1989. The Polish political situation in 1989 was unsettled. The communist leadership was aware that something fundamentally important had happened but insisted that the communist system could still be saved if reforms were introduced. They were ensured of a majority of 65 percent in parliament (Sejm) and