nist cadres with technical training or experience in running administrative organs. What was in abundance was the arrogance and overconfidence of young party activists and leaders. They were all convinced that they could accomplish anything they set their minds to by applying the "scientific" theory of Marxism-Leninism.
On the other hand, Yugoslavia was receiving substantial aid from the Western Allies. Massive United Nations deliveries of food saved the country from starvation right after the war. The United States provided an immediate credit of $300 million. After the Soviet-Yugoslav break, U.S. aid eventually totalled over $2.5 billion. Hungarian and German reparations were also intended to ease the transition from the old to the new regime.
Tito and his followers were convinced in 1944 that Yugoslavia had to follow the Soviet-type development of society and economics. They established typical Stalinist institutions. They nationalized most industry, banking, and trade; ordered the collectivization of the land; and established a central planning organ to oversee all development. Emphasis was placed on the development of Yugoslavia's heavy industry. Yugoslav foreign trade was reoriented toward the Eastern Bloc. Trade with the Soviet Union alone came to more than 23 percent of the total. By 1946, more than half of Yugoslavia's trade went east. A great deal of this traffic originated with joint Soviet- Yugoslav factories whose directors were Soviet personnel. Yugoslavia was disadvantaged by this trade, because the Soviet Union paid low prices for Yugoslav products, but charged high prices for its own deliveries. The recovery was retarded by the inexperience of the new bureaucrats. Nevertheless, by 1947, the volume of industrial production exceeded that of 1938, and agricultural production was back at peacetime levels.
In 1945, a fund for recovery was set up. It was controlled by the ministry of finance conjointly with the central planning office. It received the equivalent of $428, million delivered by the West. However, the centralized planning and administration were unprepared to spend these large sums for productive investments. Coordination was faulty, and much of the machinery delivered was either mislaid or misused. A lot of the funds were spent on the upkeep of a huge military establishment. Yet, all these obstacles were somehow overcome, and the recovery continued. United Nations' aid provided tractors for agriculture, some rolling stocks for Yugoslavia's railroads, and machine tools for mining and other industries. Landing docks were built to handle deliveries, and railroad tracks were laid. Local communist cadres organized all sorts of competitions for the rebuilding of factories, and these methods proved effective in the short run to help the recovery. The central administrative and party organs encouraged these local initiatives. By 1948, Yugoslavia's recovery was almost complete.
Davieo J., and Bogoslavjevic M., The Economy of Yugoslavia ( Belgrade, 1960); Radulovic Monty , Tito's Republic ( London, 1948); Spulber Nicolas, The Economics of Communist Eastern Europe ( New York, 1957); Tomasevich Joso, Peasants, Politics, and EconomicChange in Yugoslavia