THE THEORY OF CONTINGENT PROPOSITIONS (PART II)
1. The main purpose of this chapter is to determine the way in which report-sentences have meaning; but besides this there are several other questions concerning contingent propositions that have to be faced. I shall begin by introducing a fourth type of sentence (§§ 2 and 3): then I discuss the great question: Is it logically possible for me to be aware of another person's experiences? My answer is that it is logically possible but causally impossible (§§ 4-6). I then go on to discuss the way in which sentences of types 3a and 4 are relevant to the verification of the propositions of science (§§ 7, 8): and the ways in which we make use of sentences of types 3b and 2 (§ 9).
2. I have first of all to deal with the suggestion (Chapter III, § 9) that sentences of type 3 can be interpreted as meaning something about the bodily changes that are being suffered by the person (myself or another) who speaks. Reflective commonsense easily recognizes that many changes in immediate experience are accompanied by further observable changes in the body of the experient. Sometimes these are very striking, but I think we are quite ready to believe that, if only we knew the right place to look, and had perhaps some instruments or devices to help us, changes not at once apparent could be discovered.1 And in fact, many of the more striking inner changes are so closely associated in our experience with the outer expression, that to speak of the one is to suggest the other. So that commonly a sentence of____________________