The Law of Reapportionment: Party-Poor Theories of Representation
We now turn to the final element of the Court's constitutional theory of representation, its treatment of party subsystems of representation. To this point, we have noted three aspects to the Court's theory. The first was a dominant individualistic perception of politics reflected in one-person, one-vote and mathematical equality of the vote. The second was a growing awareness of the role of group politics in achieving representation, and the gradual incorporation of group considerations in the law of reapportionment. The third was a neopluralist experiment in formal group representation in campaign financing, as the Court sought to equalize the influence of groups by monitoring and controlling their financial input.
Each of these aspects reflected a deficiency in representational theory. The dominant individualism slighted the functional representative significance of collectives. The subsequent inclusion of groups in the equation occurred without a structural tool that would uniformly and consistently recognize the representative capacity of all groups. The neopluralist approach in campaign financing, while well-intended, falls prey to the insurmountable theoretical and pragmatic challenges of formal group representation.
The preceding discussion of party systems indicates that each of these imbalances could be rectified by giving greater credence to party structures of representation. We now turn to several areas