The Thrust of Events
The impression is strong that in the period under review the Kremlin's interests called for at least some tangible measures of arms control to be achieved. The first reason lay in the degree to which the Kremlin's proposals were probably consistent with Soviet strategic theory, military posture, and strategic expectations, particularly in that they would have preserved Soviet strengths while limiting those of the West. Second, the conflicts of political and military interests between Moscow and Peking gave the Soviet leadership good cause to stabilize relations with the West and to endeavor to prevent nuclear spread. Third, the mounting cost of defense reinforced the external military and political reasons to seek arms controls, détente, and East-West trade. Fourth, the leadership appeared to believe, at least tentatively, that the Soviet economic system could compete better in a disarming than in an arming world. None of these four inducements to arms control could be fully gratified by a mere relaxation of East-West tensions. Only specific arms control agreements could secure the strategic, political, or economic desiderata arising from these diverse factors.
Moscow continued to have strong inducements to move