would have an instance in which the compulsion is determinative, we would no longer have an example showing (2) to be true, for, as Flew notes, the manager would be no longer an agent but a victim.
In short, if "being compelled to do x" be understood as "acting under severe pressure to reject possible alternative courses of action," then though the case of the manager establishes the truth of (2), Flew provides no reason to think that (3) is true--i.e., that where there is compulsion there is a set of causally sufficient, nonsubsequent conditions for the agent's action. On the other hand, if "being compelled to do x" be understood to refer to the kind of victim compulsion present in the case of the human missile, then though the truth of (3) can be granted, there is no reason to think (2) is true, for to have a genuine choice there must be an agent, not a victim. Therefore, Flew's argument to establish the compatibilist thesis fails. 14
Of course, the failure of Flew's argument does not establish Libertarianism. However, in what follows we shall assume the Libertarian view of human freedom. In particular, we shall take as contradictory the claim that one agent can bring it about, either directly or indirectly by constituting the nature of the agent in a determinate manner, that another agent freely chooses or acts in a certain way. We shall hold that to be caused to do action x is incompatible with doing x freely.