NATO after the Cold War
" NATO after the Cold War," covering the period from 1989 to mid- 1995, was the product of a collaboration between the Lyman L. Lemnitzer Center for NATO and European Union Studies of Kent State University, USA, and the International Relations Society of the University of Kent, UK. It was published in Jarrod Wiener, ed., The Transatlantic Relationship ( London: Macmillan, 1996), pp. 26-43.
It has been a quarter of a century since the Johns Hopkins scholar David Calleo wrote that "the Supreme Allied Commander has never been the first servant of the Council, but the viceroy of the American president." The North Atlantic Treaty Organization itself, he asserted, was "the rather elaborate apparatus by which we have chosen to organize the American protectorate in Europe." 1 This was the language of revisionism in 1970, articulating a judgement that NATO was little more than an instrument of America's imperial power. Whether that power was exploitive, as the foregoing statements imply, or benign, as the United States and many of its Allies believed, the Alliance under American leadership was a success.
From the time that the Alliance was founded in 1949, Europe's fear of communism spreading under the wings of the Soviet Union kept it intact and gave meaning to the military organization it had created. Although less fearsome in 1970, Soviet power still sent shivers down the collective spine of Western Europe. And, even though detente between East and West had been in the making since the end of the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, it was a fragile coexistence always subjected to such shocks as the brutal