THE GREEK REVOLUTION
ALTHOUGH the manifold problems of the first years of peace had created some dissension between Russia and England, none had produced a serious quarrel between the two countries. The English cabinet, content with an assertion of the principle of nonintervention, had not actively resisted the policy of repression inflicted upon the continent by Alexander and Metternich. With regard to the Greek revolt such passivity was impossible. England could not ignore her protectorate in the Ionian Islands, even had the commercial and strategic importance of the Levant not impelled her attention, while Russia was powerfully driven by religious and racial, as well as by commercial and strategic, considerations. Both countries were affected nearly.
Anglo-Russian harmony might have been destroyed by the circumstances which attended the outbreak of the insurrection, for the growing estrangement of the two governments had just been punctuated by the promulgation at Laibach of a monarchical principle of antirevolutionary intervention. Actually the adoption of that formula eased the situation, since, upon the receipt of news of the rising in the Principalities, just as the congress was dispersing, logic required Alexander to repudiate Ypsilanti. Anglo-Russian tension was minimized in consequence, even though the subsequent insurrection in the Morea provoked outrages which taxed Russia's patience and provided her ambassador at Constantinople, Count Stroganov, with ample opportunity to precipitate a Russo-Turkish war. Castlereagh, cognizant of the danger and anxious to avert hostilities, immediately entered into direct communication with the tsar. Playing upon the latter's prejudices, even invoking the monarchical principle of the alliance as an argument in this case against intervention,