flexible, agreement-by-consensus approach into individualistic, accountable, inflexible, top-down contexts, we will be laying grounds for a clash of objectives. Proper consideration of differences and cultural calibration of ideas, no matter how good they may be, are essential.
On balance, it might be argued that these are the best of the times and the worst of the times for CRM. CRM has established itself as a central protagonist of the aviation system, and it has become an international training requirement mandated by ICAO. However, as the numerous warnings flags raised in this chapter attest, there are very good reasons to plan the future of CRM with critical intelligence. Effective CRM training requires dropping the piecemeal strategies largely favored in the past in favor of a system approach, because implementing CRM does not only mean training pilots, controllers, or mechanics, but developing the organization. The notion that CRM is another tool to improve organizational effectiveness has transcended "traditional" operational boundaries, and has gradually started to be acknowledged by those in "high places" ( Harper, 1995). This encouraging development must continue to gain momentum.
The imbalance of priorities and possibilities among different contexts remains a serious obstacle to the globalization of CRM as it exists today. This situation is closely related to the cross-cultural issues discussed in this chapter, and it will acquire particular relevance as airlines start implementing CRM training in response to the ICAO requirement in Annex 6. Nothing could be more distanced from reality than assuming that because CRM--as we know it--has worked in the United States, it will work anywhere. This does not imply that the basic principles underlying CRM are not of universal value--CRM is indeed a global concept. It is merely a reminder that the contents of the package with the basic principles might need to be substantially different.
Airlines within the "industrial belt" of the aviation community are dealing with "rocket science" CRM, while others not fortunate enough to have their headquarters located within this belt are still struggling with "CRM 101." The integration of flight and cabin crew CRM training is an example. As a consequence of safety studies and recommendations in accident reports, it has become the focus of attention of several major airlines ( Vandermark, 1991). On the other hand, Dahlburg ( 1995) reported that pilots in India have refused to fly with senior flight attendants who receive larger salaries than some junior co-pilots. The pilots' view expresses indignation that "they compare a co-pilot to someone who only serves coffee and tea and keeps the passengers comfortable." The dispute has reached a point where flight attendants have been put off of a number of flights. Would "American" CRM find breeding grounds within this organizational context? Faizi's plea for consideration of contexts, Johnston's doubts about the suitability of existing CRM to some cultures, and Merritt's concerns about cultural imperialism are clear reminders that frontiers exist not only to provide a means of living for customs and immigration officers.
Any discussion on cultural issues associated to the transfer of technology has sensitive overtones, some of which have been discussed in this chapter. One major airline continues to challenge the Boeing's statistics on regional accident rates mentioned earlier, arguing that although an airline may have a clean record, because the airline