THE GLOBAL STALEMATE
In 1947 Foreign Affairs published an article stating many of the principles American foreign policy was to follow in the years to come. And little wonder, since it was an article by George Kennan, then director of the State Department Policy Planning Unit. In 1964 the West is still basically engaged in "a policy of firm containment, designed to confront the Russians with unalterable counter-force at every point where they show signs of encroaching upon the interests of a peaceful and stable world." The intention is still firmly to maintain the peace without feeding pieces of countries to the hungry bears, or without, on the other hand, having to hunt the bears down with an all-out posse. The aim is still to contain Communist expansion, in order, as Kennan put it, "to promote tendencies which must eventually find their outlet in either the break-up or the gradual mellowing of Soviet power."
There is a fairly explicit behavioral theory at the foundation of this foreign policy; it seeks to buy time for Russia to outgrow the immature behavior believed typical of societies with pre-industrial poverty and messianic ambition. It expects, through repeated frustration, to extinguish the undesirable drive for expansion. But as this approach was applied, it became increasingly evident that the instruments built for expansion and to counter expansion were dangerous; and the passive policy of containment has become unpopular among the American people. Already during the Korean hostilities General MacArthur argued that the United States should go beyond the North Korean border line and bomb the Chinese "Manchurian sanctuary." His outspoken criticism led to his removal as U.N. commander; but his feelings were shared by